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ABSTRACT 
 
JESSICA LYNN GOLLIDAY: Who’s To Blame? Western Responses to the 2008 Georgia – 
Russia – South Ossetia Conflict 
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme Robertson) 
 
It has been called the August War, the Five-Day War, the start of a new Cold War, 
and even “Europe’s First War of the 21st Century.”  Whichever title one chooses, the bottom 
line is that this short war, which saw Georgian, Russian, and South Ossetian forces clash for 
five days in August 2008, has significant implications not just for the parties directly 
involved in the fighting, but also the international community.  This paper will assess the 
origins of the most recent conflict in South Ossetia as well as the response of the United 
States and the European Union.  American social scientist Charles Tilly’s book, Credit and 
Blame, provides a useful and interesting framework for this analysis.  With as many times as 
the word “blame” was thrown around during and after this conflict, it will help us to explore 
the nature of blame and how it affects the underlying tensions between Georgia, South 
Ossetia, and Russia as well as the international community’s interpretation of the conflict. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict between Russia, Georgia, and South 
Ossetia, the Russian Central Armed Forces Museum in Moscow opened a new exhibition in 
early September entitled, “The Caucasus: Five Days in August,” which portrays Russia’s 
“victory” in Georgia less than a month earlier.  “Now people understand who started this,” 
said Aleksandr Nikonov, the museum’s director.1  Georgia, too, planned to open a new 
“Russian Aggression Museum” as part of the Stalin House-Museum in the city of Gori, 
Stalin’s birthplace, and the scene of heavy fighting in August.  The museum would “expose” 
acts of Russian aggression in the most recent conflict over South Ossetia, said the Georgian 
Minister of Culture, Nikoloz Vacheishvili, in late September 2008.2  Thus, the conflict not 
only caused fierce fighting on the ground, it also launched a blustery battle of narratives 
between the Georgians, Russians, and South Ossetians as well as Western journalists, 
scholars, and heads of state to explain what “really” happened during those five days in 
August.  These dueling museums in Moscow and Gori also made sure their visitors would 
see a “true” depiction of the conflict.
                                                 
1
 Michael Schwirtz, “On Exhibit, Georgian War and a New Russian Pride,” New York Times, September 29, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/world/europe/30trophies.html, accessed February 19, 2009. 
2
 “Georgia to Open ‘Russian Aggression’ Museum,” RIA Novesti, September 25, 2008, 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080925/117096865.html, accessed February 19, 2009 and “Stalin House to Counter 
Russia’s Aggression,” Kommersant, September 26, 2008, http://www.kommersant.com/p1031352/r_500/Stali 
n_Gori_aggression, accessed February 19, 2008. 
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It has been called the August War, the Five-Day War, the start of a new Cold War, 
and even “Europe’s First War of the 21st Century.”3  Whichever title one chooses, the bottom 
line is that this short war, which saw Georgian, Russian, and South Ossetian forces clash for 
five days in August 2008, has major implications not just for the parties directly involved in 
the fighting but also the broader international community.4  This most recent conflict is just 
one in a series of confrontations between Georgia and its ethnic minority regions of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Behind these clashes, there is a long and complex history of 
antagonism, aggression, and affliction, which having never been effectively addressed or 
resolved by the warring parties, continues to spark new conflicts and further entrench 
tensions and grievances.  Additionally, the conflict was not just a simple two-sided battle 
between Georgia and South Ossetia or Georgia and Russia, but all three, which adds another 
layer of complexity to resolving this situation.   
While Moscow has played a role in past conflicts between Georgia, South Ossetia, 
and Abkhazia, the August 2008 conflict was the first time Russia explicitly and purposefully 
intervened, as its own force, rather than surreptitiously supporting these regions in their fight 
against Georgia.  Russia’s crushing use of force not only in South Ossetia, but also in 
Georgian cities and ports, shocked many in the West and challenged the international 
community’s response to and mediation of a conflict that involved the disproportionate use 
of force by one of its partners.  Additionally, Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia’s and 
Abkhazia’s independence on August 26, 2008 further complicated efforts to resolve the 
                                                 
3
 Michael Emerson, “Post-mortem on Europe’s First War of the 21st Century, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, August 27, 2008, postscript September 2, 2008, http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1697, 
accessed January 20, 2008. 
4
 Map of Georgia and E. Europe, see Appendix II.  Map of major battle sites, see Appendix I and III. 
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situation.  Thus, while the war was relatively short-lived, it had a large impact, which will be 
long-lasting in terms of the challenge it presents to international mediation efforts as well as 
the West’s relationship with Russia.   
The 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, which erupted with such fury but ended relatively 
quickly, suddenly left the world to make sense of what happened during those five days in 
August as the 2008 Summer Olympic Games opened in Beijing, China.  Both Russia and 
Georgia proclaimed they were defending their citizens from acts of aggression, violence, and 
genocide perpetrated by the other side.  Immediately following the outbreak of violence on 
August 8, 2008, new battles over who started the conflict raged in the media, amongst 
scholars, as well as between heads of state.  Initially, much of the Western media as well as 
Western leaders, focusing on Russia’s disproportionate use of force against a relatively small 
Georgian army, blamed Russia for starting the conflict.  Scholars and regional specialists, 
however, seeking to simplifying this complex dynamic, engaged in confusing debates using 
the history of the region, information about what was happening on the ground, timelines, 
and well as their own personal biases, to determine who started the conflict and who was to 
blame.  Their discussions highlighted not only the complexity of the region but also how 
overly-absorbed the Western media, scholars, and leaders became with figuring out “who 
started it?” rather than “how can we resolve the situation?” 
The response of the international community, specifically the United States and the 
European Union and its member states, provides another complicating dynamic to the battle 
over narratives.  The U.S. administration and the leaders of many EU member countries 
initially determined that Russia was the aggressor and that Georgia was, more or less, the 
innocent victim.  This interpretation was reflected in the rhetoric as well as the policy actions 
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of both parties.  Interestingly, however, by November 2008, their “stories” began to change.  
American President George W. Bush and his administration, who were perhaps Georgian 
President Mikhail Saakashvili’s most fervent supporters, became more critical of Georgia’s 
role in the conflict and notably tabled its offer to help Georgia enter NATO as quickly as 
possible.  The EU also changed course, ultimately agreeing on a softer policy response to 
Russia and reopening partnership talks that had been suspended after the conflict in August.  
While things seemed to have “returned to normal” by the end of 2008—that is, the conflict 
was unresolved and the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were unclear, as they have been 
since the early 1990s—the challenge that still remains is how to continue to effectively 
mediate this conflict in order to prevent another outbreak of violence in this region. 
 
Credit and Blame 
  
 American social scientist Charles Tilly’s book, Credit and Blame, provides an 
interesting and useful framework that will allow us to appraise the response of the 
international community and the options it has to effectively mediate this conflict.5  With as 
many times as the word “blame” was thrown around during and after this conflict, it will help 
us to take a closer look at the nature of blame and how it affects the underlying tensions 
between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia as well as the international community’s 
interpretation of the events of August 2008. 
The assignment of credit and blame is a common form of social interaction that 
affects and is affected by relationships between people and groups.6  When things go right or 
                                                 
5
 Charles Tilly, Credit and Blame (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
6
 Ibid, p. 3. 
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wrong, people insist that someone caused them, and that that individual should therefore take 
responsibility for the consequences, whether they are positive or negative.  The way in which 
credit or blame is assigned depends on the “previously existing relationships between the 
creditor and the credited and the blamer and the blamed.”7  As a result, the act of crediting 
and blaming can define or redefine relationships between the parties at hand.8  Additionally, 
credit and blame play key role in defining relationships not only on a personal level between 
friends, siblings, parents and children, but also on an international political level between 
leaders, governments, and organizations.  
The nature of credit and blame, however, differ in several notable ways, as Tilly 
describes.  First, and perhaps most clearly, “those who blame estimate a loss in value rather 
than a gain.”9  In other words, one is blamed for causing a negative outcome, such as war, but 
is credited for causing a positive outcome such as peace.  Second, blamers usually try to 
calculate the precise role an actor played in bringing about a negative outcome, whereas 
creditors tend to err on side of generosity, ignoring other outside factors such as luck or other 
people’s contributions to a positive outcome.  Third, actors striving to avoid blame try to 
deny their agency, competence, and responsibility in certain unfavorable outcome, but those 
wanting credit try to exaggerate their agency, competence, and responsibility.  Fourth,   
evaluators of losses generally demand that the perpetrator’s penalty match the loss closely, 
while in assigning credit, the reward and gain in value do not always correlate.   For example, 
one might receive a medal or certificate for saving someone’s life, but face serious penalties 
                                                 
7
 Tilly, p. 4. 
 
8
 Ibid. 
 
9
 Ibid, p. 103. 
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and be forced to compensate victims for the loss of life.  Finally, while credit sorts people 
into worthy and less worthy categories, blame draws a sharper us-them boundary, placing 
perpetrators on the other side of the line from judges, victims, and survivors.10  This paper 
will focus on blame, whose nature is far more destructive and divisive and thus often leads to 
conflict as well as appears in its aftermath. 
 
The Politics of Credit and Blame 
 
 Credit and blame play a key role in politics as a means of both explaining and 
justifying particular foreign policy objectives, actions, and decisions.  As Tilly states, “a 
great deal of public politics in the United States and elsewhere consists of taking or denying 
credit, assigning or resisting blame.”11  For example, Tilly explains that credit and blame 
played a key role in the U.S. War on Terrorism.  By blaming rogue states and non-state 
actors as a threat to peace and crediting itself as the guarantor of world order the U.S. 
justified its decision to use preemptive military intervention in order to prevent future 
terrorist attacks.12   
 The problem with blame, however, is that it often exhibits destructive and pervasive 
characteristics.  For example, as Tilly explains, “the al-Qaeda-coordinated attacks in New 
York and Washington, DC on September 11th, 2001 started an epidemic of credit and 
blame.”13  Falling into the blaming trap is relatively easy because it allows the blamer to 
avoid complicated details and instead focus on declaring that he or she was right and 
                                                 
10
 The five differences between credit and blame are based on Tilly, pp. 103-104. 
11
 Ibid, p. 22. 
12
 Ibid, p. 28-29. 
13
 Ibid, p. 25. 
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someone else was wrong.  Not only does this absolve the blamer from any responsibility for 
the negative outcome, it also puts the blamer in a superior position to the blamed.  The 
problem with this situation, as Tilly emphasizes, as will this paper, is that playing the blame 
game in politics is neither productive nor helpful.  In order to effectively address and resolve 
a negative outcome, it is more critical to try to explain why things happened and what we can 
learn from them so that the same “mistake” will not be repeated in the future.14   
 Additionally, as described above, blame is divisive in nature.  As Tilly notes, ‘us 
versus them’ boundaries “cut across much of politics. As a result, disputes over whether a 
given action deserves credit or blame figure regularly in political debate.”15  The case of war 
is a prime example.  As Tilly posits, us-them boundaries often create situations where side A 
blames side B for a particular action for which B’s supporters give B credit.  In the case of 
the September 11th terrorist attacks, for example, Americans deplored the act and blamed the 
terrorists for the death and destruction it created; whereas bin Laden’s supporters saw it as a 
significant blow against American imperialism, for which the act deserved credit.16   
In our case, Georgia blamed Russia for invading its country and attacking its people; 
whereas Russia felt that it deserved credit for protecting its citizens in South Ossetia from 
Georgian aggression.  Not only does blame impede these two countries from working 
together to resolve the conflict, since both see the other as being on the other side of an 
irreproachable boundary, it also encourages observers to take sides.  The result, as Tilly and 
this paper will emphasize, is that taking sides only serves to strengthen those that are blamed 
                                                 
14
 Tilly, p. 25. 
15
 Ibid, p. 29. 
16
 Ibid. 
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and excluded; encouraging not only their leaders and governments, but also the public to join 
together against the blamer.  Tilly cautioned that after the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
taking sides would only strengthen excluded powers and dissident movements in other 
countries.  If the U.S. bombs the presumed originating country of the attackers and thus 
forces other countries to take sides, the U.S. will aggravate the very conditions American 
leaders will declare they are preventing…democracy will decline.17  Thus, in cases of 
violence and war, blame spawns a particularly divisive and potentially dangerous cycle. 
 
Introduction to the Chapters 
 This paper will assess the history behind the August 2008 conflict in South Ossetia as 
well as the response of the international community through the lens of Tilly’s theories on 
credit and blame.  Due to the fact that we are discussing a negative outcome, war, I will focus 
primarily on the nature of blame.  While touching briefly on the origins of the conflict after 
the fall of the Russian empire and Georgia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union, the chapters 
on the history of this conflict will focus mainly on the post-Soviet period from the late 1980s 
to 2008.  Additionally, I divided the history section into two chapters in order to highlight the 
role that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has played in escalating tensions and 
violence in the region as well as the significant deterioration of Georgian – Russian relations 
under the regimes of Saakashvili and Russian President, Vladimir Putin.  In terms of 
assessing the international community’s response, I will concentrate on the period from 
August to December, 2008.    
                                                 
17
 Tilly, pp. 26-27. 
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 The second chapter will examine the nature of Georgian – South Ossetian – Russian 
relations from the late 1980s to the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia.  It is important to 
understand the underlying tensions between these three actors as well as the fact that past 
conflicts have not been resolved because these are two important root causes of the August 
2008 conflict in South Ossetia.  Here I argue that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia have entered a vicious and seemingly never-ending 
triangular cycle of tensions and grievances that are subsequently exacerbated by violence and 
war, which then reinforce these tensions and grievances, which when left unresolved after a 
conflict, serve as kindling for the subsequent fire of violence.  I will also examine the role 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Georgian independence movement played in 
provoking the first post-Soviet conflict in South Ossetia, which lasted from 1990 until 1992.  
Additionally, I will examine the role that Georgian, South Ossetian, and Russian leaders have 
played in reinforcing rather than resolving tensions and outbreaks of violence. 
 The third chapter will examine the nature of Georgian – South Ossetian – Russian 
relations from the 2003 Rose Revolution to the August 2008 conflict in South Ossetia.  The 
election of Mikhail Saakashvili in 2004, following the Rose Revolution, which forced 
President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign, dramatically escalated tensions in the region as he 
began a campaign to reincorporate the separatist regions of Adjara, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia.  Additionally, Saakashvili’s escalation of the conflicts in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia from a domestic issue to an international battle against Russia, as well as Putin’s 
willingness to play along, increased the stakes not only for the warring parties but also for the 
international community’s response.  Thus, the resulting triangle of three charismatic and 
nationalist leaders—Saakashvili in Georgia, Eduard Kokoity in South Ossetia, and Putin in 
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Russia—proved to be a volatile combination, which ultimately exploded in South Ossetia in 
August 2008.   
 The fourth chapter will examine the role that Tilly’s concepts of outcome, agency, 
competence, and responsibility play in assigning blame by assessing the debates over the 
question, “who started the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia?”  In this chapter, I will argue that 
much of the media as well as Western scholars poured far too much time and effort into 
answering this flawed and unanswerable question, which is overly simplistic and too broad to 
be answered definitely without any further specifications or limitations on the question.  
Additionally, I will argue that the other problem with the “who started it” question is that it 
was posed with only two possible answers: Russia or Georgia.  These choices ignore the role 
that other actors, such as the South Ossetians and the international community, played in 
provoking the outbreak of violence in August 2008.   
 The fifth chapter will examine the responses of the United States and the European 
Union to the conflict by discussing the “stories” they created to explain what happened as 
well as to justify their responses.  I will argue that blame plays an important role in the initial 
responses of the U.S. and EU member countries as well as why their responses changed just a 
few short months after the conflict.  Additionally, I will argue that these stories are important 
because they highlight the dangerous and infectious nature of blame, both as a foreign policy 
tool as well as a scapegoat for effective conflict mediation.   
 The sixth chapter will take a closer look at the real victims of this conflict—the 
innocent civilians who were attacked, killed, or displaced during and after the outbreak of 
violence in August.  Additionally, I will examine the role of repercussions/punishments in 
the assignment of blame.  Finally, I will conclude with a review of the role of blame and the 
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challenges it presents to effectively resolving the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia as well as to 
international conflicts more generally.
  
CHAPTER 2 
 
 THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE TO THE ROSE REVOLUTION 
 
 
In general it is easier to ignite a war than to extinguish it, simpler to start one than to end 
one, because once it has begun, a war, like a fire, begins to live according to its own laws. 
Leonid Nikitinsky, Izvestia18 
 
Introduction 
The long, tense relationship between Georgia, the separatist region of South Ossetia, 
and Russia played a significant role in sparking the August 2008 conflict.  Beginning with 
the 1988 Georgian independence movement and the first post-Soviet era war between 
Georgia and South Ossetia, continuing to the ceasefire agreement signed by Georgian leader 
Eduard Shevardnadze and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1992, to the 2003 Rose 
Revolution and a failed peace process under Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, recent 
history has allowed these ethnic tensions to fester rather than be resolved.  While the collapse 
of the Soviet Union is often thought of as peaceful, it is often forgotten that the atmosphere 
of fragmentation and confusion it created regarding national identity as well as territorial 
boundaries, led to conflicts in many former republics with multi-ethnic populations.19  In the 
case of Georgia, it led to devastating wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
                                                 
18
 Leonid Nikitinsky, “Political Extremism is Being Paid for in Blood,” Izvestia, September 18, 1993, p. 2 in 
Ana K. Niedermaier, ed., Countdown to War in Georgia: Russia’s Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the 
Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Minneapolis: East View Press, 2008), p. 51. 
19
 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism,” Slavic Review, 53, 1 (Spring 1994): 414-452. 
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Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a dissident writer and a prominent leader of Georgia’s resurgent 
nationalist movement, who would later be elected as Georgia’s first post-Soviet president in 
1991, took advantage of the freedom and openness afforded by the President of the USSR, 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost policy.  In his fight for Georgia’s independence, his rhetoric 
and actions increasingly polarized the Georgian independence movement by excluding the 
participation of the populations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Gamsakhurdia’s radical 
nationalistic rhetoric was often characterized by the phrase, “Georgia for [ethnic] 
Georgians.”20  The South Ossetians and Abkhazians, threatened by Gamsakhurdia’s claims, 
sought the protection of Soviet authorities and later Russia.  As a result, the cultural, 
linguistic, and territorial boundaries that existed between Georgia and its ethnic republics 
during Soviet times as well as under the Russian empire were easily exacerbated by the 
confusion and uncertainty of the Soviet Union’s collapse.  Mutual mistrust and suspicion as 
well as South Ossetia’s desire for independence and protection (from Moscow) from Georgia 
has made it difficult for Georgia and South Ossetia, as well as Abkhazia, to reach any 
effective peace agreement and has in fact, instead, led to violence and war. 
These relations are further complicated by Georgia’s relationship with Russia, whose 
influence on the side of the South Ossetians has also contributed to the difficulty in making 
any peace progress in the region.  Since Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union and 
especially since the election of pro-Western Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, 
Georgia and Russia have engaged in a competition of influence, prestige, and power.  While 
                                                 
20
 Ghia Nodia, “Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,” in Coppieters, 
Bruno (ed.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996), p. 8.  Whether or not 
Gamsakhurdia actually used this phrase is contested. 
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the dealings between Georgia’s second president, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Russia’s first 
president, Boris Yeltsin, may not have been as flashy as later performances by Saakashvili 
and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
dynamic of their relationship is an important factor in setting the stage for greater hostilities, 
tension, and competition under their successors.   
When Shevardnadze, the former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, returned to 
Georgia, the country was in the middle of secessionist wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
Unable to end the hostilities on his own, Shevardnadze called on Moscow for help.  Yeltsin 
agreed and assisted the Georgians in ending the conflict in Abkhazia.21  Shevardnadze, 
however, paid a high price for this assistance: acceptance of increased Russian influence in 
Georgia.  Thus, while Shevardnadze was reviled by many in Moscow for capitulating to the 
United States and bringing about the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, as the leader of Georgia, he gave Russia a second chance to re-establish its 
influence and power.      
Circumstances eventually began to change as Shevardnadze received more attention 
and aid from the West.  By 2003, however, his popularity in Georgia had waned and he was 
forced to step down following the peaceful Rose Revolution led by Mikhail Saakashvili.  
While a fragile peace held in South Ossetia for over a decade following the end of violence 
in 1992, Saakashvili’s policies brought renewed tension to the region, which will be 
discussed in further detail in the next chapter.   
Thus, Georgia’s relatively short post-Soviet history already follows a cyclic pattern of 
unresolved tensions and violence, which is exacerbated by the three-sided nature of these 
                                                 
21
 Notably, the Russians also contributed to exacerbating the conflict between Georgia and the Abkhazia by 
supporting the Abkhazians. 
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conflicts, involving not only Georgia and South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) but also Russia.  
Additionally, the personalities of the Georgian, South Ossetian, and Russian leaders also 
perpetuate this triangular cycle of tension and violence and contribute to the fluctuations 
between relative peace and violent clashes in South Ossetia.  In order to break this vicious 
cycle, however, it is important to understand the history behind and nature of these conflicts 
so that effective mediation mechanisms can be created, which will hopefully prevent future 
conflicts.   
 
Us Versus Them 
 
 War leads to the collective assignment of credit and blame more often than any other 
human activity.  “Even revolutions, bungled natural disasters, political corruption, and 
economic crises produce less collective pointing of fingers at villains and heroes,” he 
argues.22  Wars are fought between sides with opposing values, goals, and beliefs and 
fighting can start and end for a variety of reasons, but most highlight a key factor that lends 
itself to creating credit and especially blame situations: a sharp “us versus them” divide.  Us-
them boundaries develop under a variety of circumstances.  Assigning blame is an important 
factor that often creates and/or exacerbates such boundaries.  Sharp lines that separate people 
who assign credit or blame from the objects of their judgment can develop, for example, due 
to differences in ethnicity, culture, identity, ideology, and religion and arise where there are 
actual and/or perceived fundamental differences in understanding, beliefs, history, and so 
on.23  “Won, lost, stalemated, [wars] end with participants making collective claims about 
                                                 
22
 Tilly, p. 127. 
23
 Ibid, pp. 53-54. 
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who gets credit and who’s to blame.”24  At the end of a conflict, or even during it, there is 
always someone to blame; who, however, depends on which side you stand.     
Assigning blame is often much more divisive than assigning credit, as noted in 
Chapter 1, because, as Tilly explains, assigning credit “sorts people into worthy and less 
worthy” but “does not necessarily establish a sharp line between ins and outs.”  Blame, 
however, puts a person or group on the other side of a well-defined boundary, away from 
“judges, victims, and survivors.”25  This ostracism makes it much harder for that person or 
group to come back across that line.  The very existence of such a boundary, therefore, eases 
the assigning blame for a negative outcome to “them.”  As Tilly states, “on average, us-them 
boundaries add a presumption of blameworthiness to everyday interactions.”26  It is this 
persistent aggravation and blaming that often leads to conflict.   
Us-them boundaries can also cause blame to operate in the opposite direction.  While 
it is easy to blame “them” for a negative outcome, it may be equally as easy to refuse to 
acknowledge one’s own guilt.27  As Tilly explains,  
“when national leaders deny that their troops could have committed genocide, when 
warring nations try to shift the blame for massacres to the other side, or when party 
leaders refuse to punish corrupt followers, us-them boundaries override the usual 
work of estimating competence and responsibility for some negative outcome.  
Loyalty overcomes justice.”28 
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Refusing to admit to genuine accusations of blame, therefore, is just as divisive as pointing 
fingers at the other side.  When opposing sides fall into this epidemic of assigning and 
refusing blame, the ability to work together to find a cure will be next to impossible.   
In some situations actors also play a double game of credit and blame.  Competing 
sides not only desire to fix blame on the actor(s) that caused their pain (and punish them 
accordingly) but they also “seek recognition of their own merit, whether that merit consists 
of suffering borne bravely or of willingness to strike out at the rich and powerful.  They ask 
for vindication.  They ask for justice with regard to both blame and credit.”29  Justice thus 
becomes more marked and demanding in blaming situations, as Tilly explains, because once 
people have assigned blame to a particular person or group, they always call for justice to be 
served.30  Seeking justice when a person feels that he or she has been wronged often consists 
of first fixing blame on the perceived perpetrator and then imposing punishments on the 
blamed.  As a result, “assigning blame can easily become a persistent, destructive habit.”31 
Territorial and ethnic us-them divides that existed under Russian imperial and Soviet 
rule were inflamed by nationalism and politics as the Soviet Union collapsed.  What used to 
be domestic borders became international ones.  Georgia and South Ossetia were vying for 
their own independence and reasserting their identities in the post-Soviet space while 
excluding the other in their efforts.  While Gamsakhurdia did not envision including the 
Ossetians (or the Abkhazians) in Georgia’s government, he still felt that their territory was 
part of Georgia.  Consequently, the Ossetians (and Abkhazians), having been marginalized 
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by the Georgian side, looked to Moscow for help.  In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
this us-them divide led to violent clashes and war.  South Ossetia became the battleground 
not just for the release of pent up tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia, but also for 
the more dangerous antagonisms between Georgia and Russia.  Assertive Georgian, Russian, 
and South Ossetian leaders have continued to exacerbate these tensions, which ultimately led 
conflict in August 2008. 
 
Georgian – South Ossetian – Russian Relations from 1988 to 2003 
 
Under the Rule of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union 
 
Even before Georgia’s push for independence from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, 
Georgians’ had already experienced a period independence from Russian rule following the 
collapse of the Russian empire in 1917.  Historian Ronald G. Suny notes that the 
‘collectivization’ of Georgian lands during a century under the rule of the Russian empire 
had enabled Georgia “the possibility of shaping her own political future.”  Additionally, this 
greater integration as well as “intellectual awakening stirred by the noble intelligentsia” had 
left Georgia with “many of the attributes of nationhood.”32  After a brief time as part of the 
Democratic Federative Republic of Transcaucasia, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, this 
union soon fell apart and Georgia declared independence in May 1918.33  The Democratic 
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Republic of Georgia, headed by the Georgian Mensheviks, maintained Georgia’s 
independence from 1918 until 1921, when Georgia fell to the Russian Bolsheviks.34  
During this brief period of independence, the Menshevik government accused the 
Ossetians (and the Abkhazians) of cooperating with the Russian Bolsheviks.  A series of 
Ossetian rebellions followed from 1918-1920 until the Georgian Mensheviks sent forces to 
Tskhinvali to violently suppress the uprisings.  In 1921, the Bolshevik Red Army invaded 
Georgia, and South Ossetia was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the South Ossetian 
Autonomous Oblast within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).35  In 1921, 
Abkhazia proclaimed itself the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic, which was supported by 
the Bolsheviks.  Eventually it would become part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal 
Socialist Republic and later an autonomous republic of the Georgian SSR, a significant 
downgrade from its independent republic status of 1921.36 
Georgia was subsequently incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) as part of the Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (ZSFSR) along 
with Armenia and Azerbaijan, a scheme devised by Iosif Stalin, an ethnic Georgian, to 
control nationalist sentiment, despite protests from Georgia to enter separately as its own 
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republic.37  Lenin, however, did not approve of Stalin’s scheme and ordered his “abuses 
against the nationalities carried out in the name of unification be ended.”38  Georgia was thus 
given the status of a separate republic until Stalin overruled Lenin’s plan and had Georgia 
incorporated into the USSR as part of the ZSFSR.  In 1936, after the approval of a new 
USSR constitution, the ZSFSR was abolished and each of the three republics entered the 
USSR individually.39  The Georgian SSR would remain under Soviet control until 1991.  
 
Independence Movements, 1988-1991 
Georgia 
The first opposition groups in Georgia began to appear in late 1987 as the liberating 
effects of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies began to be felt across the weakening Soviet 
Union.40  As more radical groups formed, they organized mass demonstrations beginning in 
1988 to protest changes to the Soviet constitution that limited the autonomy of Union 
Republics as well as made it more difficult for the Republics to secede from the Union.41  On 
April 9, 1989, ethnic Georgian demonstrators protesting a declaration made by Abkhazians 
requesting that their republic be made a full union republic, separate from Georgia, were 
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violently suppressed by Soviet authorities.42   Toxic gas and shovels/spades were used to 
brutally attack the protestors, 20 of whom were killed and another 200 hundred were 
injured.43  The event became known as the “Tbilisi Massacre.”  
Jonathan Wheatley describes this vicious attack as a “defining moment in the history 
of modern Georgia,” undoubtedly reminiscent of the Bolshevik overthrow and suppression of 
an independent Georgia in 1921.  Nationalist rhetoric after the event, he explains, could be 
“characterized both by a refusal to compromise and … by increasing intolerance toward non-
Georgians,” presumably both ethnic minorities and Soviet authorities in Moscow.44  The 
immediate effect of the operation, therefore, was exactly the opposite of its intention.  Instead 
of subduing the opposition groups, it further radicalized them and heightened the calls for 
Georgia’s full independence from the Soviet Union.45  “This tragedy became a symbol for 
Georgian freedom fighters,” notes Irakly Areshidze.46  Georgia’s radical and intolerant 
nationalism infuriated Moscow and threatened the South Ossetians.   Thus, the Tbilisi 
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Massacre demonstrated the growing three-way conflict between Georgia, the separatist 
regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the Soviet Union (later Russia). 
While Gamsakhurdia’s contempt for ethnic minorities, especially the South Ossetians, 
pushed him out of other opposition groups, it did not impede him from eventually being 
elected as Georgia’s first post-Soviet president.47  Gamsakhurdia formed his own group, the 
Round Table, and after two rounds of elections for the Georgian Supreme Congress in 
October and November 1990, Gamsakhurdia’s party won the majority.48  Notably, at this 
time, Gamsakhurdia declared that the autonomies of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be 
preserved.49  In March 1991, however, Georgia boycotted Gorbachev’s all-Soviet Union 
referendum, an attempt to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and held 
its own referendum on independence, with 98 percent in favor.50  Gamsakhurdia was 
subsequently elected as the first President of Georgia with 87 percent of the vote.51  Despite 
declaring that South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s autonomy would be preserved, Gamsakhurdia’s 
subsequent policies as president would prove that this was a false promise.    
 
South Ossetia 
In the midst of Georgia’s secessionist movement from the Soviet Union, South 
Ossetia, officially an autonomous Soviet oblast, was trying to secede from Georgia.  Protests 
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calling for greater independence for South Ossetia spread across the region and were often 
countered by Georgian groups.  Notably, in the run up to the October 1990 Georgian 
parliamentary elections, the Georgian Supreme Soviet passed an election law that banned 
regional parties from running for election to the Georgian parliament, which was primarily 
aimed at preventing South Ossetian and Abkhazian candidates from entering the race. 52  
South Ossetia responded by declaring itself an independent republic and boycotted the 
October 1990 parliamentary elections.53  Therefore, the South Ossetians did not participate in 
the elections that brought Gamsakhurdia’s party to power.   
In December 1990, South Ossetia reasserted its independence from Georgia to which 
the Georgian Supreme Assembly responded by stripping South Ossetia of its self-proclaimed 
autonomous status, notably contradicting Gamsakhurdia’s earlier promise of autonomy.  This 
led to clashes in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’s capital city, between Ossetian militants and 
Georgian police.  Three Georgians and one Ossetian were killed with others injured.54  A 
Georgian blockade of South Ossetia also began in December 1990 and lasted until July 
1992.55  Thus, the vicious cycle of tension, mistrust, and violence was reignited as Georgia 
and South Ossetia saw each other as one of the main obstacles to their respective 
independence movements. 
 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Georgian Nationalism 
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 Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of post-Soviet Georgia, played prominently 
in creating the sharp us-them boundary between Georgians and South Ossetians that 
continues to this day.  Notably, however, his role is often overlooked as one of the 
underlying causes of the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia.  As Robert English explains,  
“trying to understand the Ossetian, Abkhazian, and other minorities’ alienation from 
Georgia without reference to the extreme nationalism of Gamsakhurdia is like trying 
to explain Yugoslavia’s collapse and Kosovo’s secession from Serbia while ignoring 
the nationalist policies of Slobodan Milosevic. Yet in all the debate over the causes of 
the Russian-Georgian war, Gamsakhurdia is rarely even mentioned.”56   
 
Additionally, as Ghia Nodia explains, “both before and after coming to power, 
[Gamsakhurdia] appealed to populist nationalism and sowed suspicion of ethnic 
minorities.”57  His support of rallies denouncing South Ossetians and Abkhazians as 
“traitors,” his refusal to allow the participation of regional parties in Georgian elections, as 
well as his revocation of South Ossetia’s autonomy in 1990, sowed a deep divide, not to 
mention fear, among the Ossetians, which would eventually lead to violence and war.   
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Georgia’s independence movement focused 
more on the resurgence of Georgian nationalism, than on the democratic ideals that various 
parties, including Gamsakhurdia’s Round Table coalition, supposedly supported.58  While the 
primary goal of Georgia’s independence movement was to break away from the USSR, it 
was accompanied by the romanticized idea of a ‘Georgian national state,” notes English.  
“The dark side of this vision was a desire to settle scores with minorities, chiefly the 
Abkhazians and Ossetians, who were seen to have benefited at Georgia’s expense from a 
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Kremlin policy of ‘divide and rule.’”59  Gamsakhurdia’s rhetoric and policies also reflected 
this dichotomy: he “claimed to share the liberal values of ethnic tolerance and the equality of 
all citizens irrespective of nationality” but “at the same time [he] did not hesitate to 
pronounce vehement threats against minorities who ‘would not behave in a proper 
manner.’”60   
Additionally, Gamsakhurdia’s reforms were more autocratic than democratic.  As 
Nodia explains, “Gamsakhurdia became the chairman of a parliament completely obedient to 
his personal will.  He strengthened his power, partly at the expense of the democratic 
freedoms that had been introduced during perestroika.”61  He was intolerant of any 
opposition to his rule and gradually continued or restored old Soviet-style autocratic policies.  
While Gamsakhurdia was able to amass great personal power, it did not last for long.  
English and Nodia agree that while Gamsakhurdia was often considered a dictator by his 
opponents, he was not a very successful one.  He knew how to create mass rallies and recruit 
supporters, but his own paranoid, radical, and divisive rhetoric eventually turned many of his 
supporters against him.62  When violent clashes broke out in Tbilisi in December 1991, 
following his suppression of opposition demonstrations, Gamsakhurdia was forced to flee 
Georgia in January 1992.63 
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 During the short time of his rule, Gamsakhurdia made a lasting impact on Georgia’s 
ethnic politics.  His radical nationalism isolated Georgians from the South Ossetians, as well 
as the Abkhazians.  As Nodia explains, the Ossetians were not seen by Georgians as fighting 
for their own rights but with siding with “them” (the Kremlin) against “us” (Georgians).64  
The resurgence of Georgian national identity, which excluded the other ethnic minority 
groups living within the Georgian republic, often played a bigger role in Gamsakhurdia’s 
independence movement than creating a strong, unified, and independent state.  As Wheatley 
argues, “the main point here is that there existed a situation within society in which a 
charismatic, demagogic and even mentally unstable leader was far more likely to become 
popular than a more moderate, stable and responsible one.”  Gamsakhurdia’s “forceful 
personality” and “messianic vision of Georgia” captured the minds of a Georgian population 
beginning to see itself as separate from the Soviet Union.65  Thus, while Gamsakhurdia’s 
radical ethno-national mobilization afforded him great popularity and power; it also 
exacerbated the us-them divide between the Georgians and the South Ossetians and 
consequently led to war.66   
 
Georgian – South Ossetian Civil War, December 1990 –July 1992 
Civil war broke out in Georgia after South Ossetia’s self-proclaimed independence 
was revoked in December 1990.  Each side ethnically cleansed the villages of the other and 
Georgia imposed an economic blockade on South Ossetia.67  After several Georgians were 
                                                 
64
 Nodia, “Political Turmoil in Georgia,” p. 84. 
65
 Wheatley, p. 60.   
66
 Zürcher, p. 136.   
 
67
 Wheatley, p. 53; Zverev, p. 44. 
 27 
 
shot and killed in Tskhinvali, the Georgian government declared a state of emergency in 
South Ossetia.  In January 1991, Georgian troops entered Tskhinvali.68  By the end of 
January, Georgian police arrested the chairman of the South Ossetian parliament, Torez 
Kulumbekov, which led to a year and a half of civil war that killed hundreds and caused 
thousands living in South Ossetia to flee to Georgia and North Ossetia.69 
Journalist Edgar O’Ballance indicates that in 1991 it was reported that up to 500 
people had died due to inter-ethnic clashes in South Ossetia.70  On January 5, 1992, a group a 
Georgian militiamen stormed Tskhinvali.71  Ossetian militants responded and many 
Ossetians began to flee to North Ossetia out of fear.  Following Gamsakhurdia’s overthrow 
in January 1992, Kulumbekov was released by the Military Council of Georgia; an 
opportunity presented by the Georgian side for dialogue with South Ossetian leaders.  South 
Ossetia rejected the offer, refusing to negotiate with the intermediary Georgian regime until 
troops were removed from the region and the blockade was ended.72  South Ossetians instead 
held a referendum on January 19, 1992, and 90 percent voted in favor of integration into the 
Russian Federation.73  As a result, Georgia began to amass troops near Tskhinvali, but later 
recalled them before any action was taken.  In April 1992, Georgian artillery began daily 
                                                 
68
 Wheatley, p. 53. 
69
 Ibid, p. 54.  Georgians living in South Ossetia fled to Georgia, while South Ossetians fled to North Ossetia, in 
Russia.. 
70
 O’Ballance, p. 117. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Zverev, p. 45. 
73
 Ibid. 
 28 
 
missile attacks on residential quarters of Tskhinvali.74   Ceasefires issued in the following 
months broke down amidst continuing violence.   
 
Moscow’s Role in the First Georgian – South Ossetian Conflict 
In April 1990, the Supreme Soviet passed a law strengthening the rights of 
autonomous regions throughout the USSR, which basically served to stir up trouble in multi-
national Union republics, like Georgia.  As Alexei Zverev explains, Moscow did not provide 
actual protection to the autonomies, but merely pitted them against the nationalistic currents 
within the republics, thus allowing for the Kremlin’s political and military meddling in the 
domestic affairs of Union Republics.75  Following an attack on Tskhinvali by Georgian 
police and paramilitary in January 1991, Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev intervened and 
attempted to end the fighting, but his efforts proved to be ineffective.76  
Gorbachev’s all-Union referendum proved to be another source of contention 
between all parties.  Georgia boycotted the referendum and voted for independence, while 
South Ossetia voted in favor of the referendum and boycotted Georgia’s independence vote.  
As a result, violence increased, with both sides accusing the other of committing horrible 
atrocities.  The Kremlin did nothing to quell the fighting.77   
Violence intensified in April 1992.  Attempted ceasefire agreements issued in May 
and June failed, pressing the Russian region of North Ossetia to get involved.78  On June 15, 
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1992, the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, warned that Russia 
might consider annexing South Ossetia.  A few days later, Supreme Soviet Vice President, 
Aleksandr Rutskoi, accused Georgian authorities of genocide against Georgia’s Russian 
population.79  Eduard Shevardnadze, the intermediary leader of Georgia, retorted by accusing 
Russia of deliberately trying to stir up trouble in Georgia.80  Thus, Russian involvement 
added another complicating layer to the conflict in South Ossetia (and later Abkhazia). 
 
Eduard Shevardnadze Returns  
 
 Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Foreign Minister of the USSR from 1985 to 1991, 
returned to Georgia following the ousting of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in January 1992.81  He 
served as Georgia’s intermediary leader until he was formally elected president of Georgia in 
1995 and reelected in 2000.  In many ways, Shevardnadze was Gamsakhurdia’s opposite.  As 
Charles King explains, Shevardnadze, a trained Soviet bureaucrat, was more concerned with 
Georgia’s stability than its ‘national reawakening,’ and thus saw his primary task as 
consolidating Georgia’s statehood.82  “A politician cannot afford to stubbornly persist in his 
view simply out of pride.  Politicians must adapt to circumstance,” Shevardnadze said as he 
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worked to bring an end to the conflict that erupted in Abkhazia in 1992.83  Suny describes 
him as “a conciliator and negotiator.”84  Upon his return to Georgia in 1992, Shevardnadze’s 
negotiating skills were quickly put to the test in South Ossetia, and soon after, in Abkhazia. 
 
Ceasefire Agreement in South Ossetia 
Shevardnadze arrived in South Ossetia in May 1992 to conduct three-party talks 
between Georgian, North Ossetian, and South Ossetian leaders. In June, as conditions 
worsened, he met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Ukraine to try to improve the 
situation.  On June 22, 1992, they signed the Sochi Agreement for a ceasefire in South 
Ossetia, the withdrawal of Russian troops, and the establishment of a monitoring commission 
that would oversee the ceasefire.85  The official status of South Ossetia, however, was left 
unresolved.86  As Gearóid Ó Tuathail assesses,  
“the Sochi agreement was a limited and imperfect instrument for handling the South 
Ossetian conflict.  There were no procedures for investigating the war crimes and 
pillage that occurred, granting not only impunity for perpetrators but implicit license 
for future activities beyond the law.”87 
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It is estimated that 1,000 people were killed in South Ossetia during the conflict and another 
60,000 people were displaced.88  While the ceasefire agreement held a fragile peace on the 
ground, no political progress was made regarding South Ossetia’s status and, as a result, the 
conflict “froze” until 2004. 
  In the years following the conflict, the Joint Control Commission (JCC), made up of 
representatives from Georgia, Russia, North and South Ossetia with the participation of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was tasked to supervise the 
observance of the ceasefire agreement as well as coordinate dialogue, conflict settlement 
agreements, economic reconstruction, and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).89  
Additionally, the JCC would coordinate the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF), which was 
also made up of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian forces, and tasked with restoring and 
maintaining peace in the region as well as reestablishing the rule of law in the conflict zone.90  
Leaving the warring parties to essentially police themselves, however, was a mistake that 
consequently led to more violence. 
 
Civil War in Abkhazia and the Role of Russia 
Fighting broke in Abkhazia just as it was ending in South Ossetia.  In July 1992, 
Abkhazia declared independence and soon tensions escalated to a violent conflict that lasted 
until 1994.  The Abkhazians were aided by volunteers from the North Caucasus in Russia 
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and Shevardnadze accused Moscow of supplying them with weapons and other support.91  
Shevardnadze and Yeltsin met several times during the conflict to try to work out ceasefire 
agreements, but each leader came to the table with different intentions.  O’Ballance explains 
that “Yeltsin wanted to bring Georgia fully into his orbit, while Shevardnadze…wanted a 
Russian friendship and cooperation treaty, after which he would be willing to enter the CIS 
on the best terms he could get.”92   
To further complicate matters for Shevardnadze, beginning in July 1993, ousted 
president Gamsakhurdia launched a rebellion against him in Mingrelia, a region of Georgia 
bordering Abkhazia.  Facing dual conflicts in Abkhazia and Mingrelia, in October 1993, 
Shevardnadze asked Yeltsin for military aid and in return Georgia would join the CIS.93  
With this additional equipment, Georgian forces managed to quell the revolt in Mingrelia.94   
In December 1993, under United Nations sponsorship, a Georgian-Abkhazian 
Agreement was signed, calling for the continuation of earlier ceasefires.  The final status of 
Abkhazia was to be determined by the UN and the Commission for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE).  Additionally, in February 1994, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze signed a 10-
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year “Georgian-Russian Friendship Treaty” as well as economic and trade agreements.95  It 
was also agreed that three Russian military bases would be established in Georgia, ostensibly 
for CIS security purposes.96  Many Georgians were not happy with these arrangements, for 
they once again allowed significant Russian influence into Georgia.   
 
Peacekeeping  
 Russia continued to play a central role in Georgia, however, as part of the 
peacekeeping efforts following the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Contrary to 
Shevardnadze’s wishes, the United Nations did not send peacekeepers to Abkhazia but 
instead authorized the deployment of 1,500 Russian peacekeepers. This situation, argue 
Carolyn Ekedahl and Melvin Goodman, further reinforced Russia’s “sphere of influence” in 
Georgia.97  Despite accusations that Russian peacekeeping efforts were more to serve 
Russia’s own interests rather than mediate the conflicts in Georgia, and additionally in light 
of a request from Yeltsin to share the peacekeeping responsibility, the U.S. did not respond.98  
As Svante Cornell explains, even as Moscow began to appoint Russian officials to both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, “these blatant interventions within Georgian territory were at 
most obliquely criticized by Western leaders, who did nothing to seek a transformation of the 
negotiation mechanisms, let alone of the peacekeeping forces.”99 
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 Thus, the peacekeeping situation put Shevardnadze in an undesirable and 
disadvantaged situation of having to depend on Russian forces to mediate the conflict zones, 
on top of having also requested Russian assistance to end the violence.  The UN had no 
interest in sending its own peacekeepers to the region.100  Therefore, since Shevardnadze did 
not have the military force to patrol and secure the regions on his own and without U.S. 
support, as a member of the UN Security Council, to call for UN peacekeepers, the job was 
left to the Russians.  Thousands of Russian troops streamed into Georgia, stationed along 
borders, ports, and at four military bases.101  Not only did Russian domination of 
peacekeeping efforts reinforce tensions between the Georgians and the South Ossetians (and 
the Abkhazians) but it also created a situation of two (Russia and South Ossetia/Abkhazia) 
against one (Georgia). 
 
Lost Opportunity for Peaceful Reintegration 
While a shaky peace managed to hold in South Ossetia, there were some signs of 
improved relations between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides.  As Ekedahl and 
Goodman note, Shevardnadze had never been a Georgian nationalist and was even willing to 
grant autonomy to South Ossetia (unlike his predecessor).102  The election of Lyudvig 
Chibirov, a relative moderate open to negotiations with Georgia, as de facto president of 
South Ossetia in 1996 opened the possibility of improved relations.  Wheatley argues, 
                                                 
100
 Ekedahl and Goodman, p. 274.  The UN sent “observers” to the region, but not peacekeepers. 
101Ibid, p. 288.  The four Russian military bases were located in Abkhazia (Gudauta), Adjara (Batumi), near 
Armenia (Akhalkalaki), and just outside Tbilisi (Vaziane).  Eventually, Russians were forced to withdraw from 
these bases, but after the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, it has been reported that they might be returning to the 
Gudauta base in Abkhazia.    
102
 Ibid, p. 264. 
 35 
 
however, that Georgians and South Ossetians “failed to take advantage of the window of 
opportunity provided by the somewhat warmer relations between their communities” during 
Chibirov’s rule.103  The International Crisis Group (ICG) explains that the two leaders met 
several times in the mid to late 1990s and that by 2000 “it seemed that Chibirov and 
Shevardnadze might ultimately agree on re-integration.” 104   
While economic relations improved during this time, a political settlement on the 
status of South Ossetia stalled and eventually stalemated after Chibirov was defeated in the 
November 2001 South Ossetian presidential elections by Eduard Kokoity, a Moscow-
supported former wrestling champion.105  Kokoity, a firm supporter of South Ossetia’s right 
to self-determination, took a tougher line toward Tbilisi than his predecessor.  Kommersant 
reported that Kokoity would not resume negotiations with Georgia unless Shevardnadze 
apologized to the South Ossetians for the “genocide” that was committed during the 1989-
1992 conflicts.106  Additionally, he called for South Ossetia’s integration into the Russian 
Federation, most likely for economic reasons and protection as well as other aid not being 
given by Georgia.107  “I am in favor of closer relations with North Ossetia and broader ties 
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with Russia…we would prefer an arrangement in which South Ossetia has associate 
membership with Russia and equal, treaty-based relations with Georgia,” Kokoity said after 
his election in December 2001.108  While talks between Chibirov and Shevardnadze may 
have signaled an improved relationship in rhetoric, the lack of action on the Georgian side to 
provide aid and other assistance to the South Ossetians ultimately gave Kokoity the support 
he needed for a campaign promoting closer ties with Russia as well as his refusal to negotiate 
with Georgia unless South Ossetia was considered an independent state.109   
 
Russian Passports 
Following the end of the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Moscow notably 
began to offer Russian passports to South Ossetians (and Abkhazians), which further 
complicated the situation and undermined Georgian authority.110  Russian efforts intensified 
in 2002 after Russia passed a new citizenship law.111  Kommersant reported that the law 
stated:  
“citizens of the former USSR who live in so-called unrecognized states (including 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and who refuse to recognize the authority of the mother 
country (and are therefore stateless) may exchange their Soviet passports for Russian 
ones.”112   
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In June 2002, Shevardnadze angrily accused Russia of “covert annexation of Georgian 
territory.”113  “This is not a friendly step from the Russian side.  Each country has a right to 
consider its own migration policy but this policy must not jeopardy other countries’ 
sovereignty,” Shevardnadze said.114  Notably, by July 2002, Civil Georgia reported that 
authorities in Abkhazia stated that up to 60 percent of its population were Russian citizens.115  
While these passports ostensibly gave South Ossetians citizenship and the ability to travel, 
they also gave Russia a reason to intervene in any future fighting between South Ossetia and 
Georgia in order to protect “its citizens.”116  Consequently, this rationale was used by Russia 
when it decided to invade Georgia in August 2008, following Georgia’s attack on South 
Ossetia.     
 
Leading up to the 2003 Rose Revolution 
Following Shevardnadze’s re-election in April 2000, Georgia’s relationship with 
Russia began to sour as it took a tougher stance with Moscow and received more attention 
from the West.  In late 2000, Georgia was angered by new Russian visa requirements for 
Georgians that were not applied to Abkhazians and South Ossetians.117  In 2001, as the 
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situation in Abkhazia worsened, Georgia notably received more Western attention.  At a UN 
Security Council meeting addressing the situation in Abkhazia, U.S. Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell, assured Georgia that it could count on the friendship and support of the U.S. in the 
face of Russian pressure.118  Relations between Russia and Georgia continued to worsen in 
2002, however, when Russia claimed that Georgia was harboring Chechen terrorists in the 
Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia.  Russia tried to use these accusations as justification for 
preemptive strikes on Georgian territory—a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty.119  Not long 
after making these claims, however, Russia saw the arrival of U.S. Special Forces in Georgia 
to help train the Georgian military to fight terrorism under Georgian Train and Equip (GTEP) 
Program.  Russia interpreted this as a threat to its sphere of influence.120  Additionally, the 
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, which began the following year, 
dealt another blow to Russia’s prominence in the region.121  But it was not until later in 2003 
that Russia would meet its biggest challenge: revolution in Georgia and the election of a fiery, 
pro-Western leader. 
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Conclusion 
 Thus, the seeds of the 2008 conflict were sown over two decades ago and even earlier 
under Russian imperial and Soviet rule.  As the Soviet Union collapsed in the late 1980s, it 
was clear that strong nationalist fervor in Georgia could not be easily suppressed.  While this 
revitalized nationalism worked in Georgia’s favor in terms of gaining independence from the 
Soviet Union, its increasingly radical nature isolated Georgia from the minority populations 
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, causing them to reach out to Moscow.  Shevardnadze also 
turned to Moscow for help in order to end the conflicts in these regions as well as negotiate 
ceasefires and peacekeeping arrangements.  Thus, Russian influence returned to Georgia, 
ironically, not long after the country tried to rid itself of Russian/Soviet domination.   
Poor relations between Russia, Georgia, and the separatist regions were further 
exacerbated by Russia’s issuance of Russian passports to the residents of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as well as growing tensions between Russia and Georgia over the latter’s closer 
relationship with the West.  While a relative peace held for over a decade in South Ossetia 
following the signing of the Sochi Agreement, the 2003 Rose Revolution and subsequent 
election of Mikhail Saakashvili, however, renewed tensions and violence in the region and 
ultimately led the August 2008 conflict. 
  
CHAPTER 3 
THE ROSE REVOLUTION TO THE AUGUST 2008 CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA 
 
 
 “The most frequent complaint I have heard from Russians is that Georgian leaders are 
prone to blame them for their own disastrous policies, so they are bad-mouthing Russia just 
to re-channel their people’s wrath…Georgians argue that the Russians are stuck in 19th 
century-style geopolitical thinking.  Russia’s outlook is all about the wounded self-esteem of 
a fallen empire: a failure to control Georgia causes it to experience phantom pains, as if 
missing a limb.”122 Ghia Nodia, Tbilisi 
 
Introduction 
While relations between Georgian and South Ossetian leaders seemed to improve in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, under Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, and South 
Ossetian leader, Lyudvig Chibirov, progress stalemated, however, when two nationalistic and 
fiery leaders were elected as their replacements.  The South Ossetians elected Eduard 
Kokoity in 2001 and the Georgians elected Mikhail Saakashvili after the dramatic 2003 Rose 
Revolution forced Shevardnadze to resign.  By this point, Russia’s new president, Vladimir 
Putin, elected in 2000 after Yeltsin resigned, had just enough time to move out of the 
shadows and on to center stage to meet his new Georgian foe.  The resulting triangle of three 
charismatic and nationalist leaders proved to be a volatile combination, which ultimately 
exploded in South Ossetia in August 2008.   
Saakashvili’s election in 2004 dramatically shifted the power dynamic that had 
existed between Shevardnadze and Yeltsin.  Shevardnadze was in a disadvantaged position 
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where he had to rely on Russian assistance to end Georgia’s civil wars in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  Additionally, he needed Russian help to establish a peacekeeping force to monitor 
the conflict zones, as discussed in the previous chapter.  Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, 
has thus tried to preserve Russian influence in Georgia, while Shevardnadze’s successor, 
Mikhail Saakashvili has tried to reassert Georgian independence and strength against Russian 
authority by orienting Georgia more closely with the West.  Both leaders frequently blamed 
each other for various problems and often exacted a penalty, in the form of harsh rhetoric or 
punitive actions, in an attempt to hurt the other’s prestige.  Additionally, Saakashvili’s 
escalation of the conflict from a domestic issue to an international battle against Russia, as 
well as Putin’s willingness to play along, increased the stakes not only for the warring parties 
but also for the international community’s response.  This brinkmanship helped set the stage 
for conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008. 
 
Georgian – South Ossetian – Russian Relations from 2003 to 2008 
 
The 2003 Rose Revolution and the Election of Mikhail Saakashvili 
As with Georgia’s previous president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, initial promises of 
democracy waned under Shevardnadze’s rule and so did his popularity.  After claims of 
election-rigging following the parliamentary elections held in November 2003, Mikhail 
Saakashvili, the young, western-educated leader of the opposition group the “National 
Movement,” led protestors into the Georgian parliament and forced Shevardnadze to resign.  
The peaceful Rose Revolution led to Saakashvili’s election as Georgia’s third post-Soviet 
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president in January 2004.123  While Georgians applauded Saakashvili’s victory, Russian 
leaders knew they had a new threat on their borders.  
 
First Adjara, Next South Ossetia? 
 One of Saakashvili’s primary goals as president was the restoration of the territorial 
integrity of Georgia.124  This was to be done quickly, but without the use of military force.  
Saakashvili envisioned bringing Adjara, followed by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, under 
Georgian control by the end of his first term as president.125  While his campaign in Adjara 
proved successful; in South Ossetia, it backfired.  As ICG argues, Saakashvili failed to 
understand the politics and culture of the region as well as the tensions and grievances that 
still existed from the previous conflict and thus further exacerbated the divide between the 
Georgians and South Ossetians by trying to bring South Ossetia under Georgian control on 
his own terms rather than through dialogue or genuine assistance to the region.126   
    
Saakashvili’s Attempt to Bring South Ossetia under Georgian Control: Renewed Fighting 
Following Saakashvili’s successful ousting of Adjaran President Aslan Abashidze, 
and the reincorporation of Adjara to Georgian central control, he then set his sights on South 
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Ossetia.127  His original plan was to incite the South Ossetian population against the regional 
government; the same idea that worked in Adjara.128  As ICG explains, in May 2004, 
Georgian decision-makers “believed their Adjaran success could easily be repeated. They 
considered that South Ossetia’s de facto president, Eduard Kokoity, had little democratic 
legitimacy or popular support and that, as in Adjara, the people would rapidly switch loyalty 
from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi.”129  Saakashvili offered various incentives to the South Ossetian 
population in an effort to bring them to his side.130  At the same time, however, he also 
stationed a large number of Georgian troops in four villages near the South Ossetian-
Georgian border under the guise of cracking down illegal trading.131   
As Wheatley argues, the Georgian government under Saakashvili was wrong to think 
that it could incite a popular uprising in South Ossetia as it had done in Adjara, because 
unlike the Adjarans, the South Ossetians did not desire to be a part of Georgia and were 
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therefore less likely to be tempted by Saakashvili’s disingenuous offers.132  Saakashvili’s 
plan soon began to backfire as ICG describes, 
“Ossetian de facto authorities successfully portrayed Georgian moves as aggressive 
first steps towards a remilitarization of the conflict that had enjoyed a ceasefire since 
1992. Kokoity’s popular support rose as he described himself as the only leader 
capable of guaranteeing Ossetians’ security, as well as their political, economic and 
cultural interests.  Assistance sent by Tbilisi was portrayed as a cheap attempt to buy 
support.”133 
 
Additionally, as Tuathail explains, Kokoity “was able to portray…Georgian actions as an 
attack on Ossetians and not on criminality, as Saakashvili claimed.134 
In July 2004, the volatile region began to heat up again as supplies of arms and 
mercenaries began to arrive in South Ossetia from Russia.  Georgia accused Russia of 
supplying weapons to the South Ossetians.  Russia countered by stating that the supplies 
were authorized as part of a Joint Controls Commission (JCC) Agreement.135  When 
Georgian peacekeepers stopped a convoy of Russian peacekeeper trucks on their way to 
Tskhinvali from Russia and seized their arms and ammunition, however, the Ossetians 
retaliated by detaining 50 Georgian peacekeepers and opening fire on Georgian checkpoints.  
The Georgians responded by moving their troops further in to South Ossetia.  A low level 
conflict began, reaching its peak in August 2004.  Having received intelligence that Russian 
troops were conducting exercises in North Ossetia, Georgia withdrew its troops, which were 
not part of the peacekeeping force, from the region.136   
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A New Ceasefire Agreement 
Luckily, the JCC managed to facilitate a ceasefire agreement on August 19, 2004 
before the violence led to another war.137  The following November, Georgian Prime 
Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity met in Sochi and signed 
an agreement on the demilitarization of the zone of conflict.  ICG assesses that “the greatest 
lesson from the May-August period is that attempts to resolve the conflict swiftly will lead to 
war.”138  ICG also warned that unless the grievances that developed during the early 1990s 
war were addressed, “efforts to re-integrate South Ossetia into Georgia are almost certain to 
lead again to violence.”  The close call in August 2004 was yet another hopeless warning of 
the potential for another war.  Unfortunately, the Georgians, South Ossetians, and Russians 
did not heed this warning in August 2008, almost exactly four years after war in South 
Ossetia was avoided.  
 
From Internal to International Conflict in South Ossetia, Summer 2004 
 
 The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia was generally considered by 
Georgian officials to be an internal affair.  But in mid-summer 2004, this stance changed 
when Saakashvili’s administration elevated the conflict to an international dispute between 
Georgia and Russia, presumably in hopes of gaining Western support for Georgia.139  At a 
rally in July 2004, Saakashvili explained that the “crisis in South Ossetia is not a problem 
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between Georgians and Ossetians.  This is a problem between Georgia and Russia.”140  The 
Georgian government accused Russia of providing military support to South Ossetia (both 
equipment and personnel), inconsistent border closures (the South Ossetian-Russian border 
remains open while other Georgian-Russian borders are closed), and installing senior 
officials in the South Ossetian government that have close ties to Moscow, among other 
allegations.141  Russia countered Georgia’s allegations, claiming that it was protecting its 
citizens in South Ossetia, and providing financial assistance to and developing economic ties 
with the region.142  Additionally, to further complicate matters that year, South Ossetia’s de 
facto president, Eduard Kokoity, repeatedly called for South Ossetia’s integration into the 
Russian Federation.143   
 While Russian leaders have long played a complicating role in the tense relationship 
between Georgia and South Ossetia, Saakashvili’s escalation of the conflict from a domestic 
to international issue, paved the way for an eventual showdown between the two countries.  
As the 2004 escalation in violence in South Ossetia highlights, both countries blamed each 
other for the problems in the region, instead of trying to work together to resolve the situation 
(as they were supposed to do as part of the peacekeeping agreement signed after the previous 
conflict in the early 1990s).  After Saakashvili came to power, there was a constant battle 
between Saakashvili and Putin to see which side could provoke the other into performing a 
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rash and reckless move on the international stage.  In an attempt to justify their own actions 
against the other, both sides unleashed a stream of belligerent rhetoric as well as refused to 
admit to any wrongdoing.  The 2004 crisis in South Ossetia was just the beginning of the 
problems that would result from Saakashvili’s and Putin’s unaccommodating and 
uncompromising stance on resolving the conflict in South Ossetia.   
 
Failed Peace Plans 
 The ceasefire of August 2004 held a fragile peace for four more years.  While there 
was no large-scale outbreak of violence, the region was still quite volatile, with frequent 
exchanges of fire and occasional deaths.144  Since 2004, both the Georgian and de facto 
South Ossetian governments have come up with proposals for resolving the conflict, but on 
their own terms.  Georgia insisted that South Ossetia must first accept that it is part of 
Georgia and then it would be possible to discuss other issues.  Conversely, South Ossetia 
rejected discussions of its status within Georgia and put forward its own proposals for 
development and rehabilitation.145  Both Saakashvili and Kokoity presented their own three-
step peace plans in 2005, which while having some common features, failed to get off the 
ground due to differing perceived timelines, mutual distrust, and lack of genuine political 
will, according to ICG.146  Thus, peace negotiations, while active, were fruitless.   
 
Dueling Governments 
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Interestingly, since 2006, the Georgian government has supported an alternate de 
facto administration in South Ossetia led by Dmitri Sanakoev, a former official in South 
Ossetia’s government before Kokoity’s election as president.147  In November 2006, there 
were notably two separate presidential elections held in South Ossetia.  In Tskhinvali, 
Kokoity was reelected and in the Georgian-administered village of Eredvi, Sanakoev was 
elected.148  Kokoity’s government supported independence from Georgia, whereas 
Sanakoev’s promoted closer ties to Tbilisi.  Both Kokoity and Sanakoev won by 
overwhelming majorities in their own regions, each of which also held a referendum on the 
status of South Ossetia, where voters in Kokoity’s region voted, not surprisingly, for 
independence and voters in Sanakoev’s region voted in favor of working on a federal 
arrangement with Georgia.149 
 Here we see yet another dividing factor impeding Georgians and South Ossetians 
from ever reaching a comprehensive peace settlement.  Instead of trying to work with the 
South Ossetian government, Tbilisi set up its own, effectively, shadow government and rival 
leader, a situation that continues to reinforce the divide between the Georgian and South 
Ossetian governments.  
 
The Pre-War Showdown: Georgia Versus Russia 2005-2008  
Following Saakashvili’s failed attempt to bring South Ossetia under Georgian control, 
more Russian officials were appointed to leading positions in the de facto governments of 
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in early 2005, further reinforcing the ties between these 
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two regions and Moscow while undermining Georgian authority.150  A series of highly 
contentious events would further plague Georgian-Russian relations over the next several 
years before finally exploding into conflict in August 2008.    
 
Mysterious Pipeline Explosions 
  In January 2006, the mysterious explosions of two pipelines carrying natural gas 
from Russia to Georgia brought the two countries to a heated exchange of words.  Georgian 
officials described the explosions as an “act of [Russian] vandalism.”  Saakashvili claimed 
that “Russia tried to force Georgia’s handover of its main gas pipeline and its other gas 
infrastructure,” and refused to engage in Russia’s “blackmailing.”151  The Russian foreign 
ministry responded by terming Georgia’s sabotage charges as “hysteria.”  The Foreign 
Ministry accused Georgia of trying to gain the support of “anti-Russian policy in the West” 
through a “mix of dependency, double standards and depraved behavior…”152  While the 
circumstances behind the explosions were not clear, each side quickly declared the other to 
be at fault while absolving itself of any responsibility.     
 
Import Embargo on Georgian Wine and Mineral Water and the Espionage Row 
Tensions between the two countries escalated dramatically in spring 2006 when 
Russia declared an import embargo on Georgian wine and its popular Borjormi mineral water 
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(Georgia’s two leading export products) citing health concerns.153  Officials in Tbilisi were 
furious, and said that the ban was politically motivated.154  Vasili Rukhadze agreed that “few 
believed that the issue was food safety.  Most analysts say Moscow was simply punishing 
Georgia for its pro-Western and reformist stand and its rapidly developing economy.”155 
 To further add to the brewing mix of hostilities between the two countries that year, 
Georgia arrested a handful of Russian military officers working in Georgia, accusing them of 
espionage.  “We had information that a serious provocation was planned by this group so we 
have decided to promptly capture these persons in order to avoid provocations,” Georgian 
Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili explained.156  Moscow responded by calling for the issue 
to be taken to the UN Security Council, recalled its ambassador from Georgia, announced 
that the Russian embassy in Tbilisi would not issue visas to Georgian citizens, blocked 
ground transportation between the countries, and finally, began deporting Georgians from 
Russia.  Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s defense minister, interestingly, called Georgia’s actions 
“completely wild and hysterical” and compared the arrests to Stalin’s repressions.157  Ivanov 
continued by explaining that “all of this is aimed at provoking the situation and raising the 
degree of escalation to the maximum level in order to deflect attention from the problems 
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that exist in Georgia.”158  Both sides, however, were in fact guilty of “provoking” and 
“escalating the degree” of the situation for their own gain and the other’s loss.      
 
Missile Landing 
In August 2007, tensions flared again when an undetonated missile landed on 
Georgian territory.  Saakashvili claimed the missile came from a Russian fighter plane that 
had violated Georgian airspace.159  “All this provocation is aimed at stirring up panic to 
weaken the stability of Georgia and to change the country’s policies,” Saakashvili said.160  
Moscow denied these accusations and its military officials said that Russia did not violate 
Georgia’s borders.  South Ossetia’s leader, Eduard Kokoity, chimed in in defense of Russia, 
claiming that Georgian planes fired the missile to discredit Russia. “This is a well-planned 
provocation,” he said.161   
 
Protests against Saakashvili 
While Georgia began to see many improvements under Saakashvili, there was one 
glaring problem: the lack of institution building and the poor development checks and 
balances left a disproportional amount of power in the hands of the president.162  Within the 
first one hundred days of his presidency, Saakashvili managed to alter the constitution to give 
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more power to the executive.  As one observer reported, the “new constitution reinforces 
Saakashvili’s hold still further: the president may dismiss parliament for any action deemed 
unconstitutional or after three successive failures to pass the state budget.”163  G. Areshidze 
and Lanskoy argue that Saakashvili effectively created “a ‘superpresidential’ system,” where 
the president could dissolve parliament but the parliament was not “compensated with any 
new means of exerting itself against expanded presidential authority.”164   
Growing complaints about Saakashvili’s regime culminated in November 2007 when 
50,000 Georgians, disgruntled by poverty, rising prices, and a sense of injustice, took to the 
streets in protest.165  Much to the dismay of the West, Saakashvili ordered the protests of 
November 7, 2007 to be violently suppressed by riot police armed with truncheons, water 
cannons, and tear-gas.166  Saakashvili made no apologies and stated that the use of harsh 
force was necessary to prevent a violent coup.167  A snap presidential election was called, 
catching the opposition off guard and at a clear disadvantage.  In the hasty election held on 
January 5, 2008, Saakashvili barely won a majority, gaining just 52 percent of the vote.   
Instead of acknowledging the people’s discontent with his rule, Saakashvili accused 
Russia of promoting the mass protests against him in order to create instability in Georgia.  
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He explained on Georgian television that this would create an advantageous situation for 
Russia.  “Consider the fact that this situation is taking place on the eve of elections in Russia, 
and the goal — to foment disorder in the country — is as clear as day,” he said.168  The 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, however, dismissed the charges as 
absurd, stating, that “the farce that accompanied the Georgian leadership’s actions is obvious 
to all.”169  
 
Kosovo Declares Independence 
Another factor that incited tension over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008.  President Putin warned that if 
Western states recognized Kosovo’s independence, it would set a precedent for other regions 
desiring independence, especially South Ossetia and Abkhazia.170  South Ossetia’s de-facto 
government, led by Eduard Kokoity, issued a declaration asserting that “the Kosovo 
precedent presents a convincing argument” for the recognition of South Ossetia’s 
independence.171  The Georgian government dismissed South Ossetia’s declaration stating 
that “the so-called South Ossetian parliament is not a legitimate body, and its declarations 
cannot have any consequences.”172 
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Georgia Denied NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
 Perhaps the central source of antagonism between Russia and Georgia is the latter’s 
bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the strong support it received 
from the United States and some European countries.  However, at the 2008 NATO summit 
in Bucharest, despite heavy backing from the U.S., Georgia and Ukraine were denied a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP).  Russia strongly opposed NATO membership for the two 
countries stating that the organization’s promise of eventual membership was “a huge 
strategic mistake.”173  Germany and France also opposed offering a MAP to Georgia and 
Ukraine, citing concerns over Russia and Georgia’s unresolved territorial disputes in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Georgia expressed concern that NATO’s denial of a MAP would be 
seen as a victory for Russia.  
 Therefore, as time passed, relations between Georgia and Russia continued to worsen 
as Putin and Saakashvili tried increase their influence, prestige, and power over each other.  
By blaming the other side for a particular problem, these leaders could absolve themselves of 
any responsibility for the negativity of an outcome; while at the same time justify their stance 
with belligerent rhetoric or aggressive actions.  Thus, Putin and Saakashvili’s relationship 
proves that Tilly is correct when he says that “assigning blame can easily become a persistent, 
destructive habit,” because as accusations of these leaders continued and intensified, so did 
the potential for conflict.    
 
The August 2008 Conflict in South Ossetia 
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As the summer of 2008 approached, so did the renewed potential for conflict.  
Tensions reached a breaking point in early August 2008 after skirmishes along the South 
Ossetian-Georgian border provoked Saakashvili to launch an attack on South Ossetia’s 
capital, Tskhinvali.  Contrary to its role in previous conflicts in the region, Russia launched a 
massive counter-offensive against Georgia in order to “protect its citizens” in South Ossetia.  
After five days of fighting, the European Union, under the leadership of French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, managed to broker a ceasefire and peace agreement.  Confusion over who 
started the conflict as well as questions about when the conflict officially began stirred 
intense debates among the Western media outlets, scholars, heads of state, and the public, 
which will be examined in the following chapters.   
 
Conclusion  
While relative peace held for over a decade in South Ossetia following the end of the 
civil war in 1992, the election of Mikhail Saakashvili brought renewed tensions and violence 
to the region.  Saakashvili’s elevation of the conflict from an internal one to an international 
one, blaming Russia in addition to the South Ossetians, made the region increasingly volatile.  
Saakashvili and former Russian President Putin provided excellent target practice for each 
other.   Both sought to blame each other for problems that arose while at the same time seek 
credit from the international community; justifying that they were right and the other side 
was wrong.  With limited intervention by the international community, the three warring 
parties, Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia were left to police themselves, making it virtually 
impossible to hold any side accountable for instigating violence, let alone trying to conduct 
thoughtful peace discussions.  As a result, past conflicts remained unresolved and grievances 
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were not effectively addressed.  Thus, the potential for conflict still existed, as proven quite 
clearly by the August 2008 conflict in South Ossetia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
WHO STARTED IT?   
 
 
“It took three months for the media to realize that Georgia launched the first attack against 
both the peaceful citizens of Tskhinvali and Russian peacekeepers, thereby compelling Russia 
to send its forces into Georgian territory,” therefore, “if most of the Western media misled 
the public for so long over the simple question of who attacked whom in the Georgian 
conflict, then what guarantee do we have that the rest of the information they are reporting is 
reliable?174 Alexei Pankin  
 
Introduction 
 
The August 2008 conflict between Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia was a violent 
manifestation of many deeply rooted antagonisms and unreconciled grievances.  Russia and 
Georgia fought not only to protect their citizens in South Ossetia, but they were also fighting 
over territory, history, influence, culture, Soviet legacy, military might, popular support, and 
so on.  While Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian forces clashed for five days in August, 
a fierce battle also took place in the media and amongst regional scholars trying to answer the 
deceivingly complicated question, “who started it?”  While it is clear how the Georgian, 
Russian, and Ossetian governments would respond, the international community and area 
scholars began their own war of words to try to prove who was really to blame. 
In this chapter, I will argue that much of the media as well as Western scholars 
poured far too much time and effort into answering an unanswerable question: “who started 
the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia?”  This question is overly simplistic and too broad to be 
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answered definitively without any further specifications or limitations on the question.  
Given the confusion behind the events that took place on the ground, combined with the 
intricate and complex history of the region, there is enough “evidence” to make a first-rate 
argument that Russia “started it” or that Georgia “started it,” depending upon which events 
are included as well as how far back in time the answer goes.  Therefore, this question is 
more a provocation to take sides in support of Russia or Georgia, rather than an attempt to 
understand this complicated conflict.  In other words, the important question is not “who 
started it?” but “who is to blame?” 
Additionally, the other problem with the “who started it” question is that it was posed 
with only two possible answers: Russia or Georgia?  Not only is this far too simplistic, but it 
also ignores the role that other parties, such as the South Ossetians and the international 
community, played in provoking the outbreak of violence in August 2008.  For example, the 
South Ossetians are just as guilty for attacking Georgian villages in South Ossetia as the 
Georgians are for attacking Ossetian villages, but interestingly, the role of South Ossetian 
forces and militias was often overlooked.175  Additionally, the international community’s 
failure to mediate the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia effectively, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, could also be considered one of many causes of this most recent conflict.176  
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Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to understanding the conflict and its history, as 
well as the role of key actors, instead of focusing so much attention on figuring out “who 
started it?” because even if we could answer that question, does it really help resolve the 
situation? 
 
Outcome, Agency, Competence, and Responsibility 
Assigning credit and blame happens so often in everyday life that we might not think 
about its deeper implications for both the giver and the recipient.  As Tilly explains, the 
assignment of credit and blame involves making judgments of outcome, agency, competence, 
and responsibility.  In the case of blame, those judging a particular situation 
“identify bad things that happened, look for their agents, decide whether the agents had 
the competence to produce the bad outcomes, and ask further whether the agents bear the 
responsibility for those outcomes because they acted with knowledge of the likely 
consequences.”177   
 
Therefore, blaming implies that the recipient (the blamed) is the agent who caused a 
particular negative outcome.  Blaming also implies that the agent is responsible for the 
outcome, which means that that he or she performed a particular act deliberately and was 
aware of the possible consequences.  It is difficult to blame someone, for example, if they did 
something accidentally or unintentionally.178   
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Competence and responsibility also play an important role in the amount or degree of 
blame received by the agent.  As Tilly explains, if the agent’s action produces no change in 
the current situation, no one is blamed (or credited).  If an act produces a negative change, 
the agent is blamed.  The greater the negative value, the greater the blame, but only to the 
extent that the agent exercised competent responsibility for the act.179  If the agent’s role in 
the outcome is slight, the agent is incompetent, or the outcome is an accident, blame 
decreases or disappears.180 
Additionally, and importantly for our purposes, Tilly notes that “responsibility does 
not necessarily equal cause.”  He explains that when assigning credit or blame, cause-effect 
relationships “usually play only a secondary and contingent part in determination of 
responsibility.” 181  Judgments of intent and competence are more important.  Therefore, in 
some cases, the agent, or the person who caused a particular outcome, may not always be the 
person who is blamed.  
As we will see in this chapter, it was very difficult to determine who started the 2008 
Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia conflict.  Numerous conflicting timelines were produced and 
scholars intensely debated who the agent responsible for the outbreak of violence was.  But, 
as we will see in the next chapter, the international community did not seem to have a 
problem identifying who was to blame, at least initially.     
 
The Trouble with Timelines 
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Official Government Timelines 
 When comparing the official conflict timelines released by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia it is 
clear who is going to be held responsible for instigating the conflict in each government’s 
rendering of the events.  The titles of these timelines give the reader a clear indication of 
which side is believed to be the competent agent responsible for provoking the war.  The 
Russian MFA titled its timeline “Peacekeeping Operation to Force Georgia to Peace,” while 
the Georgian MFA’s timeline was entitled “Timeline of Events in the Russians [sic] Invasion 
& Occupation of Georgia.”  Looking at just the day before the conflict, August 7, 2008, and 
the first day of the official start of the war on August 8, 2008, we see clearly biased views of 
the events.  Russia, on the one hand, portrays the lead up to the conflict as a series of 
incidents of Georgian aggression and violence in South Ossetia, which easily justifies 
Russia’s response to send in reinforcements.  Russia also claims on its timeline that its forces 
entered South Ossetia around 10 p.m. on August 8, 2008.182  Georgia, on the other hand, 
begins its timeline entry for August 7, 2008 with and entry that accuses the South Ossetian 
separatist government leader of threatening to ethnically cleanse Georgians and indicates that 
Russian military jet dropped bombs near Georgian military radar.183  Georgia claims that it 
sent its military into the region for the first time early in the morning of August 8th and this 
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was “in response” to the entry of Russian armed forces on Georgia’s territory, which Georgia 
claimed occurred at 11:30 p.m. on August 7th.184   
Who actually initiated the violence and the exact timing of when Russian troops 
entered South Ossetia was a major point of contention between scholars, researchers, the 
media, heads of state, and international organizations.  The presumption being that whoever 
started the conflict should also be the one to blame.  However, this may not always be the 
case.  As Tilly states, “responsibility does not necessarily equal cause.” 185  One of the most 
important aspects of blame is that its assignment is subjective and that there is always an 
underlying judgment of competence and responsibility for an outcome, which may be 
different from a series of cause and effect events.  Therefore, the real question behind the 
debate over who started the conflict is “who is responsible?” and therefore, “who is to 
blame?” 
The Russian and Georgian MFA timelines represent narratives constructed by each 
side to explain how the war started, under the general presumption that proving that the other 
side started it meant that it had also acted competently and was aware of the possible 
consequences, and thus was responsible for the outcome (war).  Through these timelines, 
both Russia and Georgia sought to justify their actions in the eyes of the international 
community; they sought credit for their own “defensive” actions, while blaming the other 
side for starting the conflict.186    
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Scholarly Timelines  
 
 While the above timeline discrepancies are to be expected considering their sources, 
there was also a serious scholarly battle that took place on Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) over 
the accuracy or “correctness” of various conflict timelines.187  Gordon Hahn, Professor at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, posted a timeline on JRL that sparked a battle.  
Hahn explained that the  
“purpose of compiling this [his] timeline is to provide an organizing aide in 
our efforts to determine what responsibility the Georgian, Ossetian, Russian, 
and Western parties involved in the crisis bear for the escalation in tension 
and violence that led to the outbreak of the five-day August war in Georgia … 
It is very likely that the August Five Day War was stumbled into or provoked 
by both sides. Readers can decide for themselves.”188 
 
Hahn’s timeline certainly attempts to be more objective than those from the Russian and 
Georgian governments.  He used a variety of different sources with the intent of portraying 
an accurate and balanced chronology of events.  The result, when looking at August 7th and 
8th on Hahn’s timeline, is that there is a greater mix of instances of aggression and violence 
by all sides; Georgians, Russians, and South Ossetians.  His emphasis on instances of 
Georgian aggression, which was largely ignored in the Western media immediately following 
the conflict, drew heated responses from other JRL subscribers.  Hahn, while trying to be 
objective by showing the culpability of all sides, was depicted as a Russia supporter by some 
JRL readers commenting on his timeline.  Amidst all of the arguing, which eventually 
deteriorated into nasty personal attacks instead of contributing new insight to the conflict, 
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this heated discussion highlights the complexities and confusion of determining who did 
what to whom when, not to mention which side was ultimately responsible.  Each JRL 
contributor presented convincing arguments and facts that would easily sway others readers 
from blaming one side to blaming the other, thus making it clear that without an independent 
investigation, the argument was more about responsibility and blame than cause.  
 
Key Points of Contention 
Georgia’s Intercepted Russian Cell Phone Conversations   
One of the biggest sources of contention, were the transcripts of intercepted Russian 
cell phone conversations that Georgia presented to the New York Times in mid-September.  
Georgia claimed that these conversations indicate that Russian troops entered South Ossetia 
through Roki Tunnel much earlier than originally thought, thus proving that Georgia’s 
actions were defensive.189  Russia rebuffed such claims.  While admitting that this “new 
intelligence” was “inconclusive on its own,” the Times noted that it “paint[ed] a more 
complicated picture of the critical last hours before war broke out.”190   
The issue was also debated on JRL.  Gordon Hahn argued that the cell phone 
intercepts were not conclusive evidence, though they may have appeared to be genuine, and 
that full investigation of all cell phone audio gathered by the Georgians was needed.191  
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Another contributor to the debate, Patrick Worms, pointed out that “the authenticity of the 
telephone intercepts which Dr Hahn finds so suspicious has not been denied by Russian 
officials contacted by Western media ... [t]hey merely dispute their importance.”192  Robert 
Hamilton agrees with Mr. Worms, citing evidence from Russian newspapers that Russian 
troops were already in or ordered to move to South Ossetia on August 7, 2008.193  
The problem with these phone transcripts, however, was that Georgia released them 
over a month after the start of the war.194  Without further investigation, they remained 
inconclusive and ultimately became overshadowed by new developments.  However, the 
flurry of excitement, debate, and finger-pointing they caused highlights the initial confusion 
and complexity about the start of the conflict and the need for an independent investigation. 
 
Allegations of Genocide and Ethnic Discrimination 
 Both Russia and Georgia accused each other of committing acts of genocide in South 
Ossetia.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained that there was “clear evidence of 
atrocities having been committed – so serious and systematic that they constitute acts of 
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genocide,” thus justifying Russia’s attack as defensive action taken to protect its citizens.195  
Georgia responded by filing a lawsuit against Russia in the International Criminal Court, 
claiming that Russia violated the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination during its interventions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 
1990.196  Initial high figures of civilian deaths were eventually disproven, but all sides, 
Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia were eventually accused of human rights violations.197 
 On JRL, both Worms and Hamilton support the claim that Georgian villages were 
ethnically cleansed and cite Human Rights Watch reports as evidence.198  Hahn responded by 
commenting that “the use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is often arbitrary. It is useful for 
mobilizing Western and other liberals, invoking the image of ‘hate crimes,’ etc.”199  While 
Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian civilians were killed, accusations of “genocide” seemed to 
be exaggerated and not based on substantiated evidence.  Instead, these accusations were 
used to draw Western attention to Georgia’s victimization and to justify Russia’s intervention.    
 
Amassing of Troops on South Ossetia’s Border 
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Another possible indicator of who started the fighting was which side moved troops 
to the region first.  Hahn noted that Georgian forces had moved into the conflict zone “far 
ahead of any Russian intervention and that by the morning of August 7th Saakashvili had 
deployed 12,000 troops into the conflict zone and/or on the South Ossetian border.”200  
Worms countered with the idea that “if the Georgian army really did move 12,000 troops to 
the border of the conflict zone … they were moving on their own sovereign territory.  One of 
the attributes of statehood is the right to move your security forces within your state.”201  
Hamilton explained that Georgia did not have 12,000 troops to move: “the idea that 12,000 
Georgian troops had been ‘amassed’ by then on the border with South Ossetia is at best a 
wild exaggeration.  The total strength of the units permanently garrisoned in Gori (not 
including bulk of the 1st Brigade, which was in Iraq when the war began) is about 3,500.”202  
Not only was it hard to pin down specific numbers, but interpreting the intent behind certain 
events was also a source of confusion and contention. 
 
Evacuation of Women and Children from South Ossetia to North Ossetia203 
An incident that caught my attention while interning with the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow during the summer of 2008 was the evacuation of women and children from South 
Ossetia to North Ossetia just a few days before all-out war broke out on August 8, 2008.  The 
serious outbreak of violence between Georgia and South Ossetia actually began on August 1-
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2, 2008.  South Ossetia accused Georgian forces of shelling its capital, Tskhinvali, while 
Georgia blamed the separatists in South Ossetia for provoking armed clashes along the 
border with Georgia.  As a result of the conflict, the South Ossetian government decided to 
evacuate children from the region to North Ossetia in the Russian Federation from August 3-
5, 2008.  Estimates of the number of evacuees from South Ossetia varied from 1,000 to 2,500 
women and children.  Was this evacuation really a result of the border clashes, which were 
not infrequent in recent years, or did the South Ossetians expect something the Georgians did 
not?  Perhaps by accusing the Georgians for attacking them, the South Ossetians were able to 
evacuate women and children under the cover of blame before a larger operation involving 
Russia began just a few days later.  
 
The Role of the United States and the West 
  
 Another source of contention in trying to figure out who started the conflict was the 
role of the United States and the West.  Is the U.S. at fault for training and supplying the 
Georgian army but not guaranteeing that its training and weapons would not be used against 
the South Ossetians or Abkhazians?  Was Georgia fed false promises of protection from the 
West?  What was the role of NATO in provoking this conflict?   These are all questions that 
were debated on JRL and indeed, in the media.  Hahn, while emphasizing that Georgia, 
Russia, and South Ossetia all mutually provoked each other, suggests that the U.S.’s role may 
have also contributed to the conflict, “certainly the U.S. carries some of the responsibility for 
the war because of its policy of NATO expansion, its courtship of Georgia and providing a 
‘krisha’ for Tbilisi while it rejected a no use of force agreement and amassed weapons.”204  
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LTC Hamilton defends the U.S. led Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which began 
in 2002 to fight Chechen terrorists hiding in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia, as “far 
from being reckless, this program was benign in its intentions and limited in its scope…”205  
Another JRL contributor, Gene Ostrovsky, doubts the U.S. role was as benign as Hamilton 
seems to suggest.  He questions whether the U.S. and its allies gave Georgia no other 
“advice” aside from these training programs, especially given all of the military hardware 
that “was being shipped to Georgia by America's allies - the very hardware which they 
appear to have relied on in planning and (badly) executing their South Ossetian operation…”  
Additionally, Ostrovsky questions the role of the U.S. State Department, who likely knew of 
Saakashvili’s intentions to retake South Ossetia “given his re-election time utterances on the 
subject” and noted that the August 2008 conflict did not “blossom from ‘zero to full-scale 
war’ overnight.”  Therefore, “what does this say about the State Department, especially given 
America’s re-commitment of support to Saakashvili's regime after this...fiasco?”206  
While the U.S. and other international actors may not have directly taken part in the 
fighting, this discussion highlights that they did play an indirect role in provoking this 
conflict, which needs to be considered along with Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian 
actions.  Additionally, as Worms and Hahn notably agree, the role of NATO was of “central 
importance…in this war.”207  Putting Georgia on the fast track for NATO membership, on 
the one hand, sent a threatening message to Russia while, on the other hand, gave Georgia 
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the false impression it would be protected.  These confusing and ambiguous messages from 
the West certainly contributed to provoking both Georgia and Russia. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the months following the conflict, a plethora of timelines and reports emerged, 
some more biased than others, but without an official independent investigation, it was 
impossible to verify certain events and information.  Thus, observers were left to use the 
information they had to discern which side they thought was the agent responsible for 
starting the conflict.  Initially, Russia was considered by many in the West to be the one that 
erred.  Given its standing in the international community, Russia surely was cognizant of the 
possible consequences it would face for attacking Georgia so aggressively.  As a result, 
Russia was blamed even though Saakashvili ordered the attack on Tskhinvali that brought 
Russian forces to the region.208 
But before I, too, make the mistake of oversimplifying the context of this conflict, I 
want to highlight that the real problem with the question “who started it?” is that it cannot be 
answered definitively.  It is not a question that asks us to look deeper and more closely into 
the underlying and complicated root causes of this conflict.  In reality it is a question of 
“whose side are you on?” or, in other words, “who is to blame?”  Unfortunately, the debate 
over this question drew the international community’s attention away from what actually 
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happened and confused efforts over how to respond.  It is far too simple to say that it was 
Russia’s fault or Georgia’s fault because this conclusion completely ignores the decades of 
deeply rooted antagonisms that served to fuel the fire that was lit in August 2008, just as it 
had been in 2004 and in the early 1990s, and even before.  No single party can take all of the 
blame, as they all (Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia) fed off of each other and continued to 
perpetuate the conflict.   
The danger of this blame game, therefore, is that it prevents us from taking the time to 
better understand the conflict.  In other words, blame is often seen as a way of resolving the 
conflict.  If it can be determined that one side is responsible, then we have the solution to 
why the conflict started in the first place; what more is there to understand?  The problem is 
that blame is infectious and divisive; once the blaming starts it easily spreads through 
multiple levels of society, from heads of state, to the media, to average citizens—as we will 
see in the next chapter—causing people to take sides without really understanding why, 
which further perpetuates divisions, tensions, and stereotypes.  In order to effectively address 
this conflict, the blaming needs to stop and instead, attention must be focused on mediation 
efforts.  Without strong and serious intervention from the international community, which 
has the ability to hold all sides accountable and encourage dialogue and reconciliation, 
violence could easily flare up again.      
  
CHAPTER 5 
 
WHO’S TO BLAME? 
 
 
 “Nothing the Russians were doing on August 6-8 was very much different from what the 
Georgians were doing, and the fact that Saakashvili began to mass forces along South 
Ossetia’s border in July trumps everything else in terms of the validity of the view that only 
the Russians were planning for war and that the peaceful democrat Saakashvili was a mere 
victim of the Russian imperial bear. This a nice storyline that plays well on FOX, CNN etc., 
but it does not square with the facts. I’ll say it again: There’s enough blame to go around for 
everyone on this war: Georgia, Russia, the US and the West, and the breakaway republics. 
Of course, this conclusion does not sit well with any of the parties…”209  Gordon Hahn 
 
Introduction 
 The 2008 Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia conflict provoked not only arguments and 
debates about “who started it?” but also stories about who was ultimately to blame.  These 
stories are significant because they radically simplify the complex tensions and events 
leading up to the conflict into dramatic and relatable narratives, which make it much easier to 
understand who was responsible for provoking the conflict.  In this chapter, I will focus on 
the responses of the United States and the European Union.  The U.S., as a firm supporter of 
Georgia, had vested interests in this conflict, but ultimately failed to take any direct action.  
The EU, having witnessed an attack in its own “neighborhood,” immediately took action to 
try to mediate it.  In fact, the EU was the only active third party, as Michael Emerson argues, 
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given the absence of the U.S. and ineffectiveness of other institutions like the United Nations 
and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).210   
Initially, both the U.S. and many of the EU member countries, like much of the 
Western media, blamed Russia for the conflict, mainly due to its disproportionate use of 
force in Georgia.  This interpretation was easily supported by stories characterizing Russia as 
a giant bear attacking poor, little, and innocent Georgia.  Consequently, Russia suffered the 
brunt of harsh criticism from both U.S. and European leaders while Georgia’s violent 
aggression was ignored…or covered up.  In November 2008, just a few months after the 
conflict ended, however, these stories interestingly began to change.  As more reports were 
released indicating that Georgia’s actions were more offensive, than defensive (as they had 
claimed), the U.S. and EU also began to change their rhetoric and their policies.  The U.S. 
took a tougher line with Georgia by withdrawing its support for Georgia’s speedy entry into 
NATO while the EU agreed to restart its partnership talks with Russia.   
In this chapter, I will argue that blame plays an important role in explaining the initial 
responses of the international community as well as why their responses changed just a few 
short months after the conflict.  The changing stories told by the U.S. and EU are important 
because they highlight the dangerous and infectious nature of blame, both as a foreign policy 
tool as well as a scapegoat for effective conflict mediation.   The danger is that the initial 
responses of the U.S. administration and the EU member states were not based on a deep 
understanding of the conflict nor were they substantiated by evidence from an independent 
investigation, but rather on the fact that Russia was the one who was perceived and judged to 
be at fault.  In other words, it fit the U.S. and EU’s foreign policy interests to initially depict 
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a newly resurgent and aggressive Russia as the bully, while ignoring Georgia’s role.  
Additionally, blame not only impedes efforts of the international community to gain an 
informed and unbiased understanding of the conflict but it also hampers mediation efforts by 
creating a divisive environment of taking sides.  The constant back and forth about who 
started the conflict and who was to blame infected leaders, their governments, the media as 
well as the public.  These disputes not only gave the false and inane impression that only one 
side, Georgia or Russia, could be responsible for instigating this conflict but they also 
distracted the international community (the U.S. and EU), not to mention the public, from 
understanding the complexity of situation and instead sucked them into the blame game.  As 
a result, while Russia, and later Georgia, and to some extent South Ossetia were blamed, 
none of the warring parties were held accountable, i.e. punished, on a commensurate level for 
the atrocities they committed.  Therefore, the conflict remains unresolved and the potential 
for more violence still exists. 
  
Why Do We Tell Stories?  
The creation of stories plays a crucial role in credit and blame situations.  Often, 
without even realizing it, agents and observers create stories in order to explain how and why 
a particular event happened.  As Tilly explains, “people assigning credit and blame usually 
embed their accounts in recognizable stories that neatly bundle together agency, 
responsibility, competence, and outcome.”211  Thus, in telling a story, it becomes clear who 
the blamer believes is the agent responsible for a certain outcome.  As Tilly sums up, “stories 
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lend themselves beautifully to judgment of the actors and to assignment of responsibility.  
They provide marvelous vehicles for credit and blame.”212  
 Stories play a significant role in credit and blame situations for several reasons.  First, 
they simplify the events in order to make a complicated situation easier to understand.  As 
Tilly explains, people often justify the assignment of credit and blame through “simplified 
cause-effect sequences involving well-defined agents and outcomes.  They ignore many 
complications.  They tell stories.” 213  Simplifying a complex series of events thus makes it 
easier to identify agency, competence, and responsibility.  Stories “rework and simplify 
social processes so that the processes become available for the telling; ‘X did Y to Z’ 
conveys a memorable image of what happened.”  As Tilly describes, if scientific accounts or 
independent investigations are compared to “everyday stories,” the latter “radically 
simplif[ies] cause-effect connections.”  In other words, stories minimize the complex webs of 
cause and effect that led to an outcome.”214  For example, blamers may omit key historical, 
cultural, or political background that explains why A attacked B because it is too confusing 
or complicated.  Thus, including only the information that supports who you believe is 
responsible and should be blamed for a negative outcome produces a dramatically different 
picture from what an independent observer might report.  As Tilly notes, the very simplicity 
of stories increases their power.215 
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Second, after the events have been simplified, stories clearly indicate who is 
responsible for a particular outcome and thus deserves to be blamed.  As Tilly describes, 
stories carry strong imputations of responsibility and therefore lend themselves to moral 
evaluations and judgments.216  Looking at the 2008 conflict in Georgia, we have seen that, 
clearly, all sides played a role in the escalation of tensions and were all responsible, to some 
degree, for the outcome.  But, the history and motivations behind this conflict are very 
complex and difficult to explain, as we have learned in Chapters 2 and 3.  It is much easier, 
therefore, to decide who is responsible and point out what that actor did wrong than to try to 
explain all of the intricate details and root causes leading to a particular outcome, in our case 
war, as exemplified by the “who started it?” debate described in the previous chapter.  
Additionally, Tilly explains that the underlying moral evaluation in stories makes them very 
valuable as an evaluation of an event after the fact, as we have seen in the previous chapter 
and will continue to examine in this chapter.  Tilly notes that this aspect of stories also helps 
explain why stories change over time especially when an actor has “behaved less than 
heroically.”217  More a judgment than an accurate account, stories are fluid and changeable. 
Thirdly, stories are significant because it is not just the events themselves that are 
important but the way these events are described, or the way a story is told, that often gains 
the most attention.  Depending on the intended audience or the bias of the person recounting 
a certain situation or series of events, the overall “picture” or impression of what happened 
will vary.  For example, the media often reports news stories a particular way in order to gain 
the audience’s attention, but as a result, the audience may not get an objective view of the 
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events.  Additionally, the media, politicians, lawyers, and other “judges” frequently turn 
important actors into “characters” in a dramatic story, describing the way in which an actor’s 
perceived qualities or characteristics make that actor more likely to be responsible for an 
outcome than another.  As Tilly explains, the retelling of the events often takes on the 
stylized form of melodramas, dividing agents into “good guys” and “bad guys” where the 
good guy receives credit and the bad guy is blamed.218  Narratives about the 2008 conflict 
often characterized the big “Russian bear” as the bad guy, whereas little “democratic 
Georgia” was the good guy who was unjustly attacked.  While dramatic storytelling calls 
attention to a particular outcome, it disguises the complicated causes behind it.  
 Finally, stories about credit and blame are particularly significant because they are 
relatable and easily invoke empathy, even if the person listening to the story was not directly 
involved.219  Crediting and blaming is a social interaction that occurs on all levels, from 
blaming your little brother for breaking your favorite toy, to crediting top notch students with 
scholarships, to blaming the Israelis for attacking the Palestinians or the Palestinians for 
attacking the Israelis.  Everyone has heard as well as created such stories.  As Tilly explains,  
“stories about credit and blame don’t simply spark the passing interest of stories 
about newly discovered dinosaurs, the latest movie star romance, or antique 
automobiles seen on the street.  They call up empathy.  They resonate because they 
raise issues in our own lives, whether or not we have any direct connection with the 
people involved…in war, peace, politics, economics, and everyday social life, people 
care greatly about the proper assignment of credit and blame.”220 
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The danger, however, behind the “relatability” of credit and blame stories is perhaps that they 
are so common that we often do not realize how such stories are created and are not fully 
aware of their impact.  As we have seen, stories are often dramatically oversimplified, impart 
responsibility for an outcome to a particular actor, and are told in such a way as to attract the 
attention of an audience.  They affect not only how the events are understood but also who is 
to be awarded and who is to be punished.  The manipulative and empathetic qualities of these 
simple stories thus make them much more influential and powerful than they seem.221     
 The initial responses and stories told by the U.S. and the EU to explain who was 
responsible for the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia are intriguing examples that highlight the 
significant role stories play in the interpretation of a conflict.  These stories clearly simplify 
the events to answer the question, “who started it?” which indicates the side that the U.S. and 
EU believe was responsible for the conflict.  The U.S. example, in particular, demonstrates 
how stories of blame not only radically simplify complex histories and events, but are also 
told in a dramatic way so as to make these esoteric conflicts understandable and relatable to 
the public.  The stories of both the U.S. and EU also show the fluidity of their interpretations, 
which initially characterized Russia as the aggressor, while ignoring the violent acts 
perpetrated by Georgia and South Ossetia, only to see their stories change just a few short 
months after the conflict had ended.  The change in U.S. and EU rhetoric and actions thus 
demonstrates the role of blame as a foreign policy tool that may initially be helpful in 
promoting one’s interests, but ultimately hampers effective mediation efforts.  
 
The Initial Response of the United States and European Union  
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 As small-scale border fighting between the Georgians and South Ossetians 
snowballed into all out war in early August 2008 and an avalanche-like Russian attack 
crashed down onto Georgian troops soon after, the international community was left to figure 
out not only what it would do but also what it would say.  How would the U.S. and EU, the 
two international actors most able to halt the hostilities, interpret what happened?  And how 
would their interpretations affect their policy statements and actions regarding Georgia and 
Russia?  The nature of blame is an important factor in understanding the initial U.S. and EU 
responses as well as why their responses began to change during the months following the 
conflict.  As we will see, not just Russia and Georgia, but also the U.S. and EU fell into the 
tempting and destructive trap of pointing fingers before understanding what had actually 
happened and why.  Failure to understand the roots of the conflict as well the intentions, 
desires, and grievances of the three parties involved (Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia) has left 
the U.S. and EU with a big mess to sort out and clean up.        
 
The United States  
As the conflict broke out during the start of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, 
China, U.S. President George W. Bush gave an interview with Bob Costas of NBC Sports.  
He told Costas that “this violence is unacceptable…I expressed my grave concern about the 
disproportionate response of Russia and that we strongly condemn bombing outside of South 
Ossetia.  It was just interesting to me that here we are trying to promote peace and harmony 
and we're witnessing a conflict take place…”222  While there was already a tinge of blame in 
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his statement, as time passed and the violence escalated, U.S. statements became harsher and 
the cause of the war, which was the result of complex and deep-rooted tensions, was 
simplified.  From the perspective of the Bush administration, Russia was clearly at fault.  On 
August 13, 2008, President Bush declared that the U.S. was on Georgia’s side, “I have 
directed a series of steps to demonstrate our solidarity with the Georgian people and bring 
about a peaceful resolution to this conflict.”223  President Bush continued his story on August 
15, 2008, when he addressed the public from the White House: 
“Some Americans listening today may wonder why events taking place in a small 
country halfway around the world matter to the United States.  In the years since it’s 
gained independence after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Georgia has become a 
courageous democracy.  Its people are making the tough choices that are required of 
free societies. … The people of Georgia have cast their lot with the free world, and 
we will not cast them aside.”224 
 
Bush’s statement not only simplified the conflict to highlight the struggle of “small” but 
“courageous” Georgia (who was unfairly pitted against Russia), but it also tried to make the 
conflict relatable and easy for the American public to understand.  In other words, why 
should the American people care about what is happening “half way around the world” in a 
small country like Georgia?   
President Bush continued by condemning Russia’s attacks, “with its actions in recent 
days Russia has damaged its credibility and its relations with the nations of the free world. 
Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st 
century.”  Bush made it clear that Russia was responsible for this conflict and therefore must 
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seek to redeem itself.  “To begin to repair its relations with the United States and Europe and 
other nations, and to begin restoring its place in the world, Russia must respect the freedom 
of its neighbors.”225  In the eyes of the U.S. leadership, it was clearly Russia who was to 
blame, at least initially. 
U.S. Vice President, Dick Cheney, and U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, 
also reinforced President Bush’s statements.   On August 10, 2008 Cheney called Georgian 
President Mikhail Saakashvili to express the U.S.’s solidarity with Georgia and he told 
Saakashvili that “Russian aggression must not go unanswered.”226  This statement clearly 
invokes the us versus them divide discussed in Chapter 2 that sets Georgia on the side of 
“right” and Russia on the side of “wrong.”  Additionally, Cheney’s statement characterized 
Russia as the bully and Georgia as the victim.  In a further display of Georgian favoritism, 
the Office of the Vice President’s also issued a statement saying that Cheney praised 
President Saakashvili for his government's restraint, offers of cease-fire, and disengagement 
of Georgian forces from the zone of conflict in South Ossetia.227  With this statement and 
others, the Bush administration made it clear that Georgia was absolved of any responsibility 
for the outbreak of violence.    
Following the end of the conflict, Rice said Russian troops’ violations of a French-
brokered ceasefire agreement “only served to deepen the isolation into which Russia is 
moving” and that there is a “very strong, growing sense that Russia is not behaving like the 
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kind of international partner that it has said that it wants to be.”228  While not explicitly 
blaming Russia, Rice’s comments did carry a tone of superiority, a sense of “I’m right and 
you’re wrong,” which implied that Russia was not living up to America’s standards of 
“democracy” and “freedom” as well as hinting that Russia could be punished with isolation 
from the international community.   
 The 2008 U.S. presidential candidates, Senator John McCain and Senator Barack 
Obama also weighed in on the conflict.  Their initial responses, however, were very different.  
McCain took a harsh stance against Russia, while Obama was more conciliatory.  TIME 
reported that “both camps issued press releases trying to out-tough each other on what the 
proper response to the Kremlin should be.  And both sides are questioning each other’s 
judgment and response.”229  McCain accused Obama of being soft on Russia and “bizarrely 
in synch with Moscow.”230  During the second presidential debate in October 2008, McCain 
stated that “we want to bring international pressures to bear on Russia in hopes that that will 
modify and eventually change their behavior.”231  He added that “the Russians must 
understand that these kinds of actions and activities are unacceptable.”232  McCain, like Bush 
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and Rice, evoked a moral high ground in his statements and also played into the simplified 
and melodramatic David versus Goliath story that began to circulate in the U.S. following the 
conflict.  McCain told audiences that he talked to Saakashvili on August 12, 2008 and 
reassured him that “the thoughts and the prayers and support of the American people are with 
that brave little nation as they struggle for their freedom and independence.”233  McCain also 
repeated at presidential debates and rallies that he told Saakashvili “I know I speak for every 
American when I say…, ‘Today we are all Georgians.’”234  Not only did McCain simplify 
and dramatize the conflict, but by proclaiming that “we are all Georgians,” he tried to make 
this esoteric web of history, culture, and politics surrounding the conflict one to which the 
American people could understand and relate, though with a clear bias against Russia.   
While McCain’s statements may have been a bit more harsh and dramatic at the start, 
Obama eventually joined in the blame game.  Obama’s initial response, notably, was much 
more reserved, however, avoiding blaming either side.  “Now is the time for Georgia and 
Russia to show restraint, and to avoid an escalation to full-scale war,” he said on August 8, 
2008.235  Later that day, however, Obama toughened his stance, still calling both sides for 
restraint but blaming Russia for attacking Georgia.  “Russia has escalated the crisis in 
Georgia through its clear and continued violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity,” Obama declared.236  His rhetoric continued to grow harsher.  During the 
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September 26, 2008 Presidential debate, Obama said that Russia “cannot be a 21st-century 
power and act like a 20th-century dictatorship.”237  Clearly, this conflict provided the U.S. 
with the opportunity to critique not only Russia’s disproportionate actions, but also the U.S.’s 
dislike of what it perceived as an increasingly authoritarian leadership.  During the second 
presidential debate in October, Obama stated that “it is important that we understand they’re 
not the old Soviet Union, but they still have nationalist impulses that I think are very 
dangerous.”238  Here Obama used the conflict to pass critical judgment on Russia’s domestic 
policies.  Thus, as Tilly described, Obama, McCain, Rice, Cheney and Bush’s statements all 
neatly packaged their judgments of outcome, agency, competence, and responsibility for the 
conflict in simple stories.      
Additionally, the 2008 Presidential campaigns highlight another problem that blame 
creates: it is often used as a political tool to justify one’s position and policies against a 
competitor, rather than one that effectively resolves a complicated situation.  “The 
presidential campaigns of Barack Obama and John McCain have seen the crisis largely as an 
occasion for political sniping, as they are perhaps more eager to gain an edge in the race for 
the White House than seek solutions,” TIME reported.239  Thus, blame is often used as a 
political tool to win votes in an election campaign, demonstrating that what actually 
happened is not as important as how it is interpreted or told.  Realizing that his moderate 
policies left him out of the blame game, Obama changed his stance and toughened his 
rhetoric, which only added to the overall negative perception of Russia in the West.  
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Obama’s initial objective stance, which sought to understand the role that both Russia and 
Georgia played before determining who was to blame, would have been much more helpful, 
however, in trying to effectively address and mediate the conflict. 
The U.S.’s continued support of Georgia’s membership in NATO also indicated that 
Russia was to blame for provoking the 2008 conflict.  Notably, before, during, and after the 
conflict, the U.S. strongly supported offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia.  
Russia’s attack clearly showed that Georgia needed to be protected from Russia’s aggressive 
and unpredictable behavior.  As U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated on October 9, 
2008, “we have sought a constructive relationship with Russia, but unfortunately their 
behavior has undermined security in the region and raised real concerns about their 
intentions.”240  Russia’s attack on “small-but-courageous” Georgia therefore lent further 
support to the U.S. position.  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Daniel Fried, reiterated at a 
meeting in Tbilisi in October 2008 “that the United States supports Georgia’s aspiration to 
join NATO and become integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures.”241  Thus, the U.S. still 
supported Georgia’s entry into NATO’s collective security structure, even though it had just 
been attacked by Russia. 
The story told by the State Department in Moscow was a little different.  U.S. 
Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle, tried to clarify claims criticizing the U.S.’s unequivocal 
support of Georgia.  “Our [U.S.] support for Georgia is not unconditional. We made very 
clear to Georgia that we did not support the use of force to resolve the status of S. Ossetia 
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and Abkhazia and we consider that the Georgian leadership made a mistake in using force in 
the way they did to try to resolve that issue.”  But, he countered, the U.S. “continue[s] to 
support Georgia’s democratic ambitions, we do not see that in a zero-sum relationship to 
Georgia’s relationship with Russia.” 242  Given Beylre’s position, it is clear that his 
statements regarding Russia’s role in and responsibility for the conflict would be a bit more 
reserved than other U.S. government representatives, but here was also see the U.S.’s story 
begin to change.  Beyrle’s statement shows the underlying hypocrisy of U.S. policy by 
acknowledging that Georgia “made a mistake” in using force but that the U.S. still supported 
Georgia’s “democratic ambitions,” which, in reality, have been sliding under Saakashvili.243     
As discussed in the previous chapter, trying to answer the question, “who started it?” 
(which really means “who is to blame?”) in a conflict as complicated and deeply rooted as 
this one is virtually impossible, but that did not stop the U.S. from trying.  Instead of holding 
all sides—Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia—accountable, the U.S. further inflamed the 
existing tensions by radically oversimplifying the conflict so as to blame Russia while 
essentially absolving Georgia from any responsibility.  The conflict also proved to be an 
excellent vehicle for the U.S. to reinforce its foreign policy interests through its judgments of 
agency, competency, and responsibility.  By taking a harsh and critical stance against Russia 
and blaming it for starting the conflict, the U.S. was able to reinforce its disapproval of 
Russia’s domestic policies, namely its backsliding on democracy, while at the same time 
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emphasize its own foreign policy interests.  Specifically, in the months leading up to the 
conflict in August 2008, the U.S. had supported Kosovo’s independence, sought swift NATO 
membership for Georgia, and pushed for the installation of a missile defense shield in Czech 
Republic and Poland.  While these foreign policy objectives were not aimed, per se, directly 
at Russia, they certainly irked Moscow, and sent a strong message that while the U.S. did not 
see Russia as a threat, it also did not see it as a partner.   
As Stephen Sestanovich notes, however, U.S. foreign policy toward Russia in the late 
1990s and early 2000s was not much better than it was in 2008.  By 2002, he explains, Putin 
had witnessed the U.S. bombing of Serbia and occupation of Kosovo, faced criticism for its 
wars in Chechnya, saw the U.S. begin to train and equip Georgian forces, and witnessed 
NATO expand to include former the Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.  At 
this time however, both Bush and Putin agreed that relations were good.  The difference 
between the situation in 2002 and 2008, however, was the nature of the relationship as well 
as changing perceptions. In 2002, “it was the two sides’ shared conviction that the two 
countries saw major goals and major problems in broadly compatible terms—and that, more 
than ever before, they could deal with each other as equals,” describes Sestanovich.244  Since 
then, relations have worsened, as Sestanovich describes, due to Russia’s interpretation of 
events that have happened since then, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the “colored 
revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as rising energy prices.  From these events, 
Sestanovich explains, “Putin and his colleagues seem to have drawn very different 
conclusions from those of 2002—namely, that Russia’s relations with the United States (and 
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the West in general) were inherently unequal and conflictual and that Russia would better 
serve its interests if it followed its own course.”245   
The problem is that, in turn, Russia’s new course of aggressive rhetoric, proclaimed 
“sovereign democracy,” manipulation of energy supplies, and, finally, its attack on Georgia, 
made it a target of negative U.S. political rhetoric even before the 2008 conflict ended.246  
Therefore, it follows that the U.S. administration would blame Russia for attacking Georgia.  
In other words, blaming Russia was not based on an in-depth understanding of the situation 
or in light of evidence from an independent investigation, but on which side the U.S. 
perceived and judged to be wrong.  Blame is thus a reflection of the dynamic of the current 
political relationship between the U.S. and Russia.  As a result, U.S. leaders formulated 
simplified and dramatized stories to support their political stance against Russia’s aggressive 
and manipulative tendencies, rather than seeking a more objective interpretation of the 
conflict. 
 
The European Union 
The other key international player in the Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia conflict was 
the European Union.  Given the U.S.’s strong support for Georgia before the conflict, the EU 
was, arguably, a less biased peace broker as well as the only international actor to actively try 
to mediate the conflict.  The challenge for the EU, however, was to get all 27 member 
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countries to agree on a unified response.  The formulation of a common EU foreign policy on 
any issue is notably challenge in and of itself, and the EU’s relationship with Russia serves as 
a striking example of this difficulty.247  As I have alluded to earlier in this paper, blame is in 
the eyes of the beholder, as highlighted by the differing interpretations held by the EU 
member countries.  Their initial responses to the conflict could be divided into three camps: 
those who were wary of blaming Russia and favored a softer EU policy response, those who 
blamed Russia and favored a harsher policy response, and those who tried to stay somewhere 
in the middle.248  The EU, a collective body, unlike the U.S., a single actor, had to take all of 
these varying interpretations into account when formulating its policy.  While there was 
initially a lot of sharp criticism of Russia’s disproportionate use of force, the EU ultimately 
followed a much milder policy line toward Russia.     
 
Differing Interpretations  
Italy 
 Italy was the one of the strongest supporters of a softer EU policy response toward 
Russia due to its important trade and economic relations with Russia as well as the close 
personal ties between Russia’s Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, and Italy’s Prime Minister, 
Silvio Berlusconi. 249  Italian Foreign Minister, Franco Frattini said on August 11, 2008, “We 
cannot create an anti-Russia coalition in Europe, and on this point we are close to Putin’s 
                                                 
247
 Margot Light, “Russia and the EU: Strategic Partners or Strategic Rivals?” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 46 s1 (2008), pp. 7-27. 
248
 “The View From Europe” RFE/RL, August 27, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/The_View_From_Eu 
rope/1194356.html, accessed December 31, 2008. 
249
 “Italy Will Remain Silent In Showdown With Russia,” RFE/RL, August 27, 2008,  
http://www.rferl.org/Content/Italy_Will_Remain_Silent_In_Showdown_With_Russia/1194338.html, accessed 
December 31, 2008. 
 90 
 
position.”  He also stated that “this war has pushed Georgia further away” from Europe.250  
Additionally, Berlusconi emphasized in early September 2008, “that Russia had to remain a 
part of the ‘West.’”  Russia and Europe “are both part of the West, not two separate parts, but 
one,” he explained.251  After meeting with U.S. Vice President Cheney in September, 
Berlusconi noted that Italy “helped make this an isolated incident instead of a detonator” that 
could have started a new “Cold War.”  Thus, Italy’s stance was one that supported rather than 
blamed Russia and instead viewed Georgia’s actions more critically.   
 
France 
France and Germany, however, tried to remain neutral.  French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who also held the rotating EU presidency at the time of the conflict, refused to 
condemn one side over the other.  In August 2008, Sarkozy explained during a meeting at the 
Kremlin as he tried to work out a ceasefire agreement, that “it is perfectly normal that Russia 
wants to defend its own interests and the interests of Russians inside Russia, as well as 
Russian speakers outside Russia.”  But, he added, “it is equally important that we – I mean 
the international community – want to guarantee the integrity, sovereignty, and independence 
of Georgia.”252  Additionally, in October 2008, following a meeting with members of the 
European Parliament, Sarkozy explained that “We saw the war as a completely 
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disproportionate reaction from the Russians in the case of the conflict with Georgia,” he said.  
“And I use this word – disproportionate – because it was disproportionate to intervene as the 
Russians did in Georgia.  And I also use the word ‘reaction’, because [Russia’s] reaction was 
disproportionate but that was because there was a preceding inappropriate action, and Europe 
has to be fair.  Europe shouldn’t hesitate to step out of the ideological framework to put 
across a message of peace.”253  Therefore, according to Sarkozy, both Russia and Georgia 
were each due their fair share of the blame. 
Additionally, in an interview with RFE/RL, Philippe Moreau Defarges, researcher at 
the French Institute for International Relations, explained that France was caught between 
two contradictory points of view.  One the one hand, Russia’s actions in Georgia were 
unacceptable and a violation of international law and on the other hand, it is important to 
keep Russia engaged and “not to commit to a new Cold War.”  Defarges also commented 
that EU’s objective was “not to have a tough policy” but “to have a united European 
Union.”254    
 
Germany 
Germany’s position also fluctuates in its support of Georgia and Russia.  In the lead 
up to the 2008 conflict German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was skeptical of Saakashvili’s 
regime.  At the April NATO summit in Bucharest, she stated, “countries that are directly 
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involved in regional conflicts cannot, in my opinion, become members of NATO.”255  
Following the August 2008 conflict, however, Merkel changed her stance.  After meeting 
with Saakashvili, she stated,  
“I think that a clear political statement is once again very important in this situation: 
Georgia is a free and independent country, and every free and independent country 
can decide together with the members of NATO when and how it joins NATO.  In 
December, there will be an initial assessment of the situation, and we are clearly on 
track for a NATO membership.”256   
 
As Der Spiegel assessed, “Merkel wants to show that the German government stands at 
Georgia’s side.  Likewise, she wants to endeavor within the EU and NATO to maintain an 
open dialogue with Russia.”257  Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, however, remained skeptical over speeding up the NATO membership process for 
Georgia.258  Therefore, even within the top German leadership, the ambiguity and fickleness 
of Merkel’s stance keeps Germany from blaming one side over the other.  
Additionally, German foreign-policy analyst, Jan Techau, of the German Council on 
Foreign Relations commented that while Germany’s government had initially made strong 
statements against Russia’s attack and had been very strict on Russia’s troop withdrawal 
from Georgia, the only way to create “a common, unified European stance” is to tone “down 
the very, very tough rhetoric.”  He assessed the EU’s challenge as the following: “the 
Russians have all the short-term leverage, and can play us, we have only long-term leverage 
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and find it hard to agree on anything in the long term.  That is the real problem of the 
situation in strategic terms.”259 
 
UK/Britain 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, along with the Baltic countries and Poland, the 
British Foreign Ministry condemned Russia’s actions and called for a tougher EU policy 
response.  The British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said “over Georgia, Russia has 
moved from support for territorial integrity to breaking up the country in three weeks, and 
relied entirely on military force to do so.”  He said that the West must now “raise the costs to 
Russia of disregarding its responsibilities and that “Europe needs to act as one when dealing 
with third parties like Russia.”260  As the BBC reported, Miliband argued that the EU must 
stand by its newer members as well as send Russia the message: “that force is not the right 
way to take forward these difficult issues.”261  Interestingly, Georgia’s use of force was not 
mentioned.     
 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland 
  
The leaders of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, as well as Ukraine, traveled to 
Tbilisi following the conflict to express their solidarity with Georgia.  They issued a joint 
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statement urging the European Union and NATO to “stand up against the spread of 
imperialist and revisionist policy” by Russia.262  Additionally, Estonian president Thomas 
Ilves called for a suspension of the EU-Russia partnership talks and the Lithuanian Foreign 
Ministry said the EU should halt its assistance to Moscow and cancel talks on simplifying 
Russian applications for EU visas.263  Polish President Lech Kaczynski declared that “Russia 
has again shown its true face.”264     
 
Toward a Unified EU Response? 
 
The wide range of responses described above reflects the different national interests 
of each of the EU member countries.  Thus, in forming a collective policy stance, EU 
member states were faced with the decision of taking a harsh policy response against Russia, 
which might have the negative effect of isolating Moscow, or to take a softer policy in order 
to keep Russia engaged, in hopes of maintaining a cooperative partnership.  What these 
differing stories tell us, however, is that each EU member country, like the U.S., perceived 
and judged the conflict according to their own foreign policy interests.  Given Italy’s closes 
economic ties with Russia, it makes sense that Italy would not want to blame Russia for the 
conflict.  France and Germany also have strong economic relations with Russia, mainly 
concerning the import of Russian oil and especially gas, which would keep them from 
blaming Russia.265  The Baltic countries and Poland, however, have a longstanding dislike 
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and mistrust of Russia due to the Soviet legacy of invasion and occupation of their countries, 
which would lead them to perceive Russia as the instigator of the conflict in Georgia.  
Britain’s harsh stance toward Russia is rooted in part due to anger and frustration over the 
death of Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB officer turned Kremlin critic, living in London, 
who died after mysteriously being poisoned with polonium, a radioactive isotope, in 
November 2006.266  Britain accused Russia of orchestrating the plot.  Additionally, Britain 
was irked when Russia ordered the British Council, a state-funded organization promoting 
British culture and language abroad, to shut down its regional offices by January 1, 2008.267 
 The interesting similarity between all of these responses, however, is that, like the 
United States, many European leaders also seemed to avoid holding Saakashvili accountable, 
at least initially.  Most of the West’s immediate attention was focused on Russia’s 
disproportionate use of force in Georgia, which led lead to the seemingly logical and 
reasonable conclusion that Russia was to blame.268  Thus, Saakashvili was often able to get 
away with being the innocent victim in the eyes of many U.S. and European leaders. 
 
Emergency EU Meeting  
 French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who at the time held the EU Presidency, reacted 
quickly to facilitate a ceasefire and negotiated a six-point peace plan.  As Michael Emerson 
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explains, “all but one point are sensible.” 269  The problem, as Emerson highlights, was that 
Sarkozy permitted Russia to add a second part to point five, which had originally read 
“Russian military forces should withdraw to the lines preceding the outbreak of hostilities.”  
Russia then insisted on adding the ambiguous phrase: “while waiting for an international 
mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will put into effect additional security 
measures.”270  This addition to point five, however, ultimately gave Russia the rational to 
keep its troops in the region for much longer than Sarkozy intended.       
In response to Russia’s failure to fully withdraw its troops from Georgia, Sarkozy 
announced on August 24, 2008, that the European Council would hold an emergency 
meeting on September 1, 2008, to discuss the situation.  As the International Herald Tribune 
summed up,  
“the rare four-hour crisis meeting in Brussels produced blunt criticism of Moscow’s 
military offensive in Georgia but proposed few concrete measures that might deter 
Russia from similar action.  The leaders did, however, offer firm support for Georgia, 
promising reconstruction aid and civilian monitors.”271   
 
The closing point of the Council’s presidency conclusions, however, contained a statement 
that amounted to the closest the EU would get to punishing Russia, “until troops have 
withdrawn to the positions held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation of the 
Partnership Agreement will be postponed.”272  Negotiations remained in limbo, however, for 
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just over two months, when building pressure among some EU leaders called for talks to 
reopen in November 2008.  Thus, the EU’s feeble “punishment” ultimately had little impact. 
 While the EU member countries condemned “the disproportionate reaction of Russia” 
and stated that “military action of this kind is not a solution and is not acceptable,” there was, 
interestingly, absolutely no mention of Georgia’s attacks on Tskhinvali or any other acts of 
violence perpetrated by Georgia.  Additionally, while EU leaders had substantial reasons to 
upbraid Russia, they failed to also hold Georgia accountable for its share of the brutality and 
instead simply offered to “supply aid for reconstruction in Georgia” and to “step up its 
relations with Georgia, including visa facilitation measures and the possible establishment of 
a full and comprehensive free trade area…” without requiring anything in return.273  
Focusing blame on Russia and ignoring Georgia and South Ossetia’s role in provoking the 
conflict and perpetrating acts of violence not only reinforced the tensions and divisions 
between the three warring parties, but also likely contributed to Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev’s decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which 
could be perceived as a way for Russia to get back at the West for its one-sided interpretation 
of the conflict.   
The US and EU in Agreement? 
 While the U.S. and the EU member countries offered several different interpretations 
of who was responsible for the conflict, it seems that most leaders could agree that Russia’s 
disproportionate use of force as well as its subsequent recognition of the independence of 
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South Ossetia and Abkhazia were unacceptable.  After the emergency EU meeting on 
September 1, 2008, Sarkozy announced that Europe was united in its concern over Russia’s 
aggressive actions.274  The EU stated that Russia’s recognition of the independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia was “unacceptable” and called on other states not to recognize their 
independence.275  “The question is what does Russia want?” said Sarkozy. “Does it want 
confidence and co-operation, or does it want distrust and an increasing tension?  The EU 
would welcome a real partnership with Russia which is in the interest of all.  But you have to 
be two to tango; you have to be two to have a partnership.”276  The U.S. also condemned 
Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  President Bush stated, “Russia’s action 
only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations.”277 
 While Russia certainly deserved to be rebuked by the international community for its 
excessive use of force in Georgia, not to mention the fact that it attacked another sovereign 
state and then recognized portions of that country’s territory as independent countries, it was 
not, however, the only to one blame.  The U.S. and EU’s failure to hold Georgia and South 
Ossetia accountable not only shows a lack of understanding of the underlying root causes of 
the problem but also further exacerbates it.  As Gordon Hahn explained,  
“my own view is that there is blame to go around - to the Georgians, Russians, the 
U.S. and its allies …, and the breakaway regions.  Unfortunately, the Western media 
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and think tank circles insist on focusing and digging up evidence to prove only 
Russia’s part in the this tragedy.”278 
 
It did not take long, however, for the West to start taking a more critical look at Georgia’s 
role in the conflict.  As new information became available, there was an interesting shift in 
U.S. and EU policy toward Russia and Georgia in November 2008.  
 
How and Why the U.S. and EU Responses Changed 
 As I have argued, a key point that was absent from many of the initial Western 
interpretations of the conflict was Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali as well as the violent role 
of South Ossetian militias.  But these interpretations would soon change as more 
international organizations released reports and NGO representatives began to speak up 
about what they saw on the ground.  Eventually the stories would change from blaming 
Russia to looking more critically at Georgia.  The irony of it all, however, was that much of 
this “new” information was known all along.    
 
“New” Reports Highlight Georgia’s Culpability, Emphasize That All Parties Responsible 
 The reports analyzing the 2008 Russia-Georgia-South Ossetia conflict released by 
several prominent NGOs, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Amnesty 
International, as well as reports from OSCE monitors came to seemingly new conclusions, 
namely that Georgia was just as much at fault as Russia.  Additionally, many reports stated 
that all parties needed to be held accountable for the acts of violence they committed.  While 
it took some time, eventually the international community admitted that Russia was not the 
only one to blame.     
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ICG released a report on August 22, 2008, notably not long after the conflict, 
describing “Moscow’s initial moves into South Ossetia” as part of a response “to a disastrous 
miscalculation by a Georgian leadership that was impatient with gradual confidence building 
and a Russian-dominated negotiations process.”279  The ICG report also stated that “all sides 
bear responsibility for the humanitarian consequences of the violence, as tens of thousands of 
civilians in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the rest of Georgia have been displaced amid 
disturbing reports of atrocities.”280  ICG also implicates the U.S. and EU for “failing to 
adequately press President Saakashvili to abandon a quick-fix approach toward restoring 
Georgian control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.”281  With regard to NATO membership 
for Georgia, ICG warned that a “decision on MAP or membership status should not be taken 
in the heat of the current crisis,” a warning that NATO and even the U.S. heeded, in the 
end.282  ICG’s report is significant because as early as August, they indicated (and had 
indicated much earlier) that all sides were responsible, while the U.S. and EU continued to 
blame Russia. 
 Despite the release of ICG’s thorough report, the stories about the war’s start did not 
really begin to change in the West until November 2008.  The tide began to turn on Georgia 
when international monitors working under the mandate of the OSCE concluded that Georgia 
had acted offensively rather than defensively—as it had claimed.  Two former British 
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military officers, both senior level representatives with the OSCE at the time of the conflict, 
reported that Georgian rockets and artillery were hitting civilian targets in South Ossetia 
before the Russians attacked.  “It was clear to me that the [Georgian] attack was completely 
indiscriminate and disproportionate to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation,” one of 
the OSCE representatives said.283  The reports given by these OSCE monitors and officials 
cast serious doubt on Georgia’s side of the story and contributed, at least in part, I believe, to 
the West’s change in perception of the conflict, because as more attention was placed on 
Georgia’s role, Western leaders would be forced to address the discrepancies in their rhetoric, 
which, up this point, had focused mostly on blaming Russia. 
Georgia’s role was further questioned with the release of a report by Amnesty 
International (AI), entitled “Civilians in the Line of Fire, The Georgia-Russia Conflict,” on 
November 18, 2008.  The report concluded that the information collected and presented by 
AI together with that of other sources, “indicates that serious violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law were committed by all parties, both during the course of 
the conflict and in its aftermath.”284  The report received much attention for holding not just 
Russia responsible but also Georgia and significantly South Ossetia.  
   
“New” Information Versus “Ignored” Information  
 The accounts from the OSCE representatives published in the New York Times, the 
Amnesty International report, and other Western news media reports that came out in 
November claimed to have discovered “new” evidence of the atrocities committed by 
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Georgia and many media outlets dramatically concluded that it was in fact Georgia that 
started the war.  Who knew?  Apparently only those of us who had been listening to the news 
all along and understood even an inkling of the complexity of this conflict as well as were 
aware of Saakashvili’s increasing undemocratic agenda in Georgia.  As highlighted by 
several articles by journalists, academics, and bloggers on Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), much 
of the Western media either purposefully or stupidly ignored Georgia’s responsibility for the 
conflict.  The danger is that the West focused its attention not on trying to understand the 
conflict, but on trying to figure out who started it.  First it was Russia.  Then it was Georgia.  
Everyone, including the media, the public, and most significantly, Western leaders, were 
distracted by trying to figure out who was to blame and creating stories to backup their 
assertions instead of realizing that in a conflict as complex and deeply rooted as this one, 
fixing blame on one party is not going to resolve anything, in fact, it makes the situation 
worse.  Thus, while the stories circulating in the West changed from blaming Russia to 
blaming Georgia in November, this “new” information seemed to merely open another 
entertaining but petty and unhelpful debate that brought the international community no 
closer to effectively resolving the conflict.  
An entry from Sean’s Russia Blog (SRB) included on JRL’s coverage of the conflict 
summarizes the growing change in perspective in the Western media.  While the war may 
have ended, the contention surrounding its story was still raging on in November:   
“The Ossetian War is now three months past, but the battle over the war’s narrative 
continues.  There has been a turnaround in the Western media over the last few 
weeks.  Whereas Russia was lambasted during the war as the evil villain and poor 
little Georgia the innocent victim…Georgia is now blamed for a reckless attack, and 
 103 
 
even war crimes.  To suggest anything of the sort three months ago would have been 
considered madness and laughed off as Putinist apologia.”285 
 
Sean continues by commenting that while the release of the Amnesty International report 
played a significant role in changing Western rhetoric about the war, as a whole the report 
“doesn’t reveal any new information but rather corroborates what was already known with 
more testimony” and that “the real truth was that those ‘civilian accounts’ and ‘facts’ were 
always there” 286  Additionally, Sean’s entry highlights Tilly’s argument that stories provide 
excellent vehicles for blame as they package who was judged to be responsible.  What makes 
the media’s change in perspective interesting, however, is that the rhetoric of U.S. and EU 
leaders seemed to change around the same time, that is, away from solely blaming Russia 
and toward holding Saakashvili accountable for his aggressive actions.  
As Charles King, professor at Georgetown University, pointed out in November 2008, 
“it’s time for the West to realize that Mikhail Saakashvili is no saint and that Georgia is not 
quite an innocent victim.”287  He explains that the West bought Saakashvili’s “story line of a 
small democratic ally being bullied by a rogue superpower” and that Russia’s version of the 
story, that “an unbalanced and power-hungry Georgian president was preparing genocide 
against the ethnic Ossetians, sold well at home but didn’t resonate so well internationally.”288  
He chastised the U.S. for “the same simplistic thinking that helped cause the war” by 
overemphasizing “Georgia’s interests solely in the context of Russia’s nefarious gambits on  
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Eurasia’s strategic chessboard” and warned that the U.S. must base its policies on Georgia’s 
real needs and interests not just on “one man’s savvy marketing campaign.” 289 
 Anne Applebaum, journalist and author, commented in an Op-ed piece for the 
Washington Post, on the investigative reports from the New York Times, BBC, National 
Public Radio (NPR), European monitors, and others that offered seemingly “new” 
information on the start of August conflict.  “Their most important conclusion?” she asked, 
that “Georgia started it and killed civilians in the process. My conclusion?  We knew that 
already.”290  Applebaum  points to the fact that we “have known for some time, that Georgian 
President Mikhail Saakashvili is susceptible to extreme bouts of criminal foolhardiness … 
We knew that about him –and so did the Russians.”291  While it could be argued that Georgia 
‘fired the first shot’ in this conflict, as Applebaum rightly points out, “it is important to focus, 
not just once but again and again, on the nuances, complications and layers of this story; it is 
one whose retelling has recently become an important propaganda tool in an ongoing 
transatlantic war of words.”  As we have discussed, the underlying history behind and causes 
of this conflict are far too complex to be boiled down to Russia started it or Georgia started it.  
These simplified stories, as Applebaum indicates, are designed for dramatic effect and to 
back up the foreign policy interests of the countries telling them.  As Tilly warned us, the 
power (and danger) of blame stories is their very simplicity, for it is a way to attempt to hide 
the real motivations behind an accusation of blame.  In our case, the West’s focus on blaming 
Russia while selectively ignoring Georgia’s role in the conflict was reflective of its own 
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foreign policy interests rather than providing any real insight or understanding of the history 
behind or implications of the conflict. 
 
The U.S. Story Changes 
In November 2008, just a few months after the end the August conflict, the U.S. 
stance on the August 2008 conflict began to change dramatically.  Initially, as we have 
discussed, the U.S. was an outspoken supporter of Georgia and largely critical of Russia.  
Following the publication of the New York Times article citing the reports from international 
monitors with the OSCE that questioned Georgia’s telling of the events, State Department 
Deputy Spokesman, Robert Wood, said that while the Georgia attack was a mistake, it did 
not justify the Russian response.  Wood said that the important thing now is not assigning 
blame, but returning stability to the region.292  “I think we need to get away from looking at 
who did what first, because, as I said, I don’t think we’ll ever really get to the bottom of 
that,” said Wood. “The important thing is for us to move forward, and that’s what we’re 
trying to do, in terms of trying to reconstruct Georgia…”293  Voice of America also reported a 
senior U.S. State Department official as saying that the Bush administration did not want to 
fix blame for the war because it could inflame matters.294  This is clearly a dramatic change 
in rhetoric from the stories that were told during and immediately after the conflict.  While 
Wood’s comment about not focusing on who started it seems objective and fair, in reality the 
U.S. administration realized that its original story no longer held up and thus “moving 
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forward” meant ignoring the complications of the conflict and returning to “normalcy” as 
quickly as possible.   
The most dramatic change in U.S. policy, however, came in late November 2008 
when the U.S. administration announced that it was no longer supporting a NATO 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia.  The news was especially surprising given the 
fact that the U.S. continued to support a MAP for Georgia during and immediately after the 
2008 conflict despite the concerns of some other NATO member countries.  On November 
26, 2008, Condoleezza Rice tabled the plan to offer Georgia (and Ukraine) a NATO MAP at 
the following week’s NATO meeting in Brussels.  Rice insisted the move did not signal a 
policy shift, but that her statement was made in light of European concerns that both 
countries are far from ready to join the alliance. “Georgia and Ukraine are not ready for 
membership.  That is very clear,” Rice said. 295  An article by the Associated Press stated that 
in the face of continued opposition from France and Germany, U.S. officials said they would 
abandon the push to get the action plans next week and would try to assist the two countries 
in joining via different means.296  Additionally, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Daniel 
Fried, stated on November 25, 2008, “I think it’s fair to predict there would be no NATO 
membership offer for some years to come…they [Georgia and Ukraine] have a lot of work to 
do and we will help them.”297  Fried conceded, however, that the MAP “was never an end in 
itself,” but only one possible path to membership.  “We want to keep that process in motion, 
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even though the circumstances have changed…” Fried said.298  Russia applauded the U.S. 
decision to delay Georgia’s NATO membership.  “I am pleased that reason has prevailed, 
unfortunately only at the end of the current U.S. administration,” Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev said during a broadcast on Russian television on November 28, 2008.299   
While the U.S. administration’s more critical assessment of Georgia’s role as well as 
its decision to hold off further support for Georgia’s immediate membership in NATO 
showed constraint and more thoughtful consideration of the international situation in the 
aftermath of the conflict, the dramatic shift in its rhetoric and unclear polices seemed to send 
a mixed message to Russia.  In suddenly trying to be more objective, the U.S. (and EU as we 
will see) not only revealed that its original assessment of the situation was incorrect and 
based on preconceived notions of who was to blame, but also seemingly gave the U.S. an 
excuse to shy away from enacting any strict penalties against Russia and Georgia.  The result 
is that not only does the conflict remain unresolved and the perpetrators of violence 
unpunished (as was notably also the case in 1992 and 2004), but the potential for yet another 
conflict is a serious possibility.   
 
The EU Story Changes 
 Just as “new” information was being released about Georgia’s role in the conflict, the 
EU’s position toward Russia also began to change.  In early November 2008, the European 
Commission called on EU member states to unfreeze partnership talks with Russia, which 
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were suspended following the conflict in Georgia.300  According to a statement released by 
Brussels, the Commission argued for renewed Partnership and Cooperation talks for two 
reasons: “first because this would allow the EU to pursue its own interests with Russia, and 
secondly because this is the best way to engage with Russia on the basis of a unified 
position.”301  A spokesperson for the Commission also emphasized that this does not mean a 
return to business as usual, though many East European members argued it would be viewed 
that way by Russia.302  On November 10, 2008, however, the EU announced it would resume 
partnership talks with Russia.303  All EU member countries, except for Lithuania, seemed to 
be in agreement that it would be in the EU’s interests for talks to resume, but more wary 
members, such as Britain and Sweden, emphasized that EU-Russia relations must kept under 
tight review and that the EU must emphasize that it was not simply “turning the page on the 
conflict in Georgia.”304   
In the end, after much debate, many EU member countries decided that it was more 
important to keep Russia engaged than to isolate it with harsh policies or severe punishment.  
While the EU statements emphasized that resuming talks with Moscow was not a return to 
business as usual, the EU’s policies have not done enough to make this clear to the Russian 
leadership.  The Moscow Times reported that Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, said 
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“we ... express our wish to turn the page and increase mutual activities.”305  By failing to 
enact more severe repercussions against the warring parties, the EU sent the message to 
Russia, Georgia, and the rest of the international community that it was more important to get 
things back to normal and move past this horrible conflict, as if it never happened.  The EU, 
like the U.S., has effectively let Russia and Georgia get away with serious atrocities without 
any consequences other than verbal reprimanding and the temporary suspension of 
partnership talks.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 The shifting Western stories about who was to blame for the 2008 conflict in Georgia 
are excellent examples of how stories simplify complicated situations into easy-to-understand 
cause and effect scenarios, often dramatizing the events into relatable stories such as “good 
versus evil” or “David versus Goliath,” in order to clearly and easily incriminate one side 
over the other.  Obviously, these stories merely served to backup the U.S. and EU’s foreign 
policy interests.  Both the U.S. and EU were facing problems with how to deal with a more 
aggressive Russia and the U.S. had the additional vested interest in supporting Saakashvili’s 
regime in Georgia.  Thus, blaming Russia “made sense.”  The challenge for the international 
community was to frame the conflict in such a way that Russia looked like the “bad guy.”  
Russia’s disproportionate use of force gave the West something on which to focus attention 
and blame, thus enabling them to ignore and/or cover up Georgia’s role, not to mention the 
South Ossetians, who never seemed to be blamed, but certainly contributed to the outbreak of 
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violence.306  Therefore, when the Western media began to point to “new evidence” of 
Georgia’s role in the conflict, the West had to revise its story.  In reality, the information was 
not really new; so much as it was probably ignored.  Reports released not long after the 
conflict ended indicated that Saakashvili attacked Tskhinvali before the Russians sent in their 
troops.  Not to mention that ICG, as early as August, implicated all sides, including the West, 
in contributing to this conflict.  Therefore, U.S. and EU leaders also began reevaluate not 
only their rhetoric but also their policies.  The U.S. notably backed off its push to get Georgia 
into NATO and the EU reopened partnership talks with Russia.   
 There are two problems with the outcome of the U.S. and EU responses.  First, the 
constant back and forth about who started the conflict and who was to blame not only gave 
the ridiculous impression that only side could be responsible for this conflict but also 
distracted the international community, not to mention the public, from the complexity of 
situation, thus sucking them into the never-ending blame game that ultimately says a lot but 
does nothing.   Secondly, the trend of trying to get things back to normal without holding the 
warring parties accountable by means of tough punishments, or at least penalties, for the 
atrocities they committed, which included the murder and displacement of innocent civilians, 
is extremely dangerous because it sends the message that such acts are permissible and will 
not punished.  In fact, it seems that rather than being punished, Russia and Georgia were 
practically “rewarded” with new partnership agreements.  The EU reopened PCA talks with 
Russia in late 2008 and in January 2009, the U.S. signed a strategic partnership agreement 
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with Georgia to cooperate in areas of defense, trade, energy security, cultural exchanges and 
strengthening democratic institutions.307 
 While the war between Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia was relatively small and 
quick, its magnitude and consequences will be large and long-lasting.  Emerson dramatically 
described it as “Europe’s first war of the 21st century.”  The problem is, however, that 
judging from the U.S. and EU’s unwillingness to hold any of the parties accountable, as 
evidence by their failing to exact any substantive penalties or repercussions, shows that the 
war, unfortunately, was not understood to be as significant as it in fact it was.  
Thus, the international community has once again proven that it is unable to prevent 
conflicts in vulnerable areas, despite clear signs of persistent provocation by the involved 
parties.  Yet again, warning signs were ignored and violence escalated to war.  This is, of 
course, not the first time this has happened in South Ossetia, which makes the 2008 conflict 
between Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia not only the most tragic but also the most 
embarrassing for the international community.    
                                                 
307
 “U.S. Signs Strategic Partnership Pact with Georgia,” Reuters, January 9, 2009, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/gc07/idUKTRE5086UQ20090109, accessed February 26, 2008. 
 
  
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
“The war over South Ossetia lasted only one week, but will have devastating consequences 
for civilians for generations to come…Focusing  on who started the war or who committed 
worse atrocities, as some observers are, misses the point, which is the urgent need to hold all 
who are responsible accountable and to allow displaced people to return  home safely.” 
Rachel Denber, Human Rights Watch308 
 
 The 2008 conflict between Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia lasted for only five 
days, but its implications for future international conflict prevention and mediation efforts as 
well as for international relations will last for years to come.  The most important objective, 
however, is to address the needs of victims, which means that the blaming needs to stop and 
the perpetrators of violence must be held accountable.  Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia 
have once again confirmed that they are unable to resolve this conflict themselves and thus it 
is of the utmost importance that the international community remains engaged and dedicated 
to resolving this conflict in order to prevent another outbreak of violence that could have far 
worse consequences. 
 
The Real Victims 
 
 In the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict, it is important to remember that the real 
victims were not Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, or Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, or South Ossetian de-facto President 
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Eduard Kokoity, or their governments, but the innocent civilians who were violently attacked, 
displaced, or killed.  The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in Georgia estimated that as of September 12, 2008, a total of 192,000 people 
were displaced as a result of the most recent conflict.  Of that total, 127,000 people were 
displaced in Georgia, 30,000 in South Ossetia, and 35,000 in Russia.309  Additionally, 
UNHCR reports that Georgia is also dealing with 222,000 cases of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) from previous conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 1990s.310  
The precise number of civilians who were killed during the August conflict, however, is 
unclear.  Just one day after the conflict started, high-level Russian government officials and 
authorities in South Ossetia, estimated there were between 1,500 to 2,000 civilian casualties.  
These estimates seem exaggerated and doubtful according to organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Crisis Group (ICG) who have reported various 
figures from governments, hospitals, and other sources, in the low to mid one-hundreds.311  
As HRW explains, 
“The issue of civilian casualty figures has been enormously controversial, in part due 
to the acute propaganda war that has surrounded this conflict.  Countless officials, 
journalists, and the like have asked us how many civilians were killed in the conflict.  
In response to these queries Human Rights Watch has emphasized that we do not 
have the capacity to make a definitive determination of civilian casualties.  We have 
questioned the initial 1,500-2,000 figure and the methodology used to arrive at it.  We 
have emphasized that these were not reliable figures because it was not clear how 
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such figures were compiled so quickly, as early as August 8 and 9, since many of the 
dead in South Ossetia and throughout the region were initially buried in the 
courtyards by relatives or neighbors, and that therefore the task of gathering such 
figures is difficult and time-consuming.”312    
 
Whether one, one hundred, or one thousand people were killed, any number of civilian 
causalities is unjustified and inexcusable.  The fact that hundreds of civilians were killed and 
almost 200,000 people were displaced indicates the gravity of this conflict and the serious 
need for not only international mediation, but also international aid to help those displaced to 
return to their homes as soon as possible as well as to rebuild infrastructure that was damaged 
or destroyed during the fighting.  All sides, Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia, are 
responsible for the death and displacement of civilians.  Therefore, each of these actors must 
be held accountable not only for the outbreak of violence but also for ensuring that victims 
receive the aid they need.  Additionally, the governments of Russia, Georgia, and South 
Ossetia must be held responsible for ensuring that those who perpetrated acts of violence 
against innocent civilians are prosecuted and held accountable for the crimes they committed. 
 
Repercussions and Punishment 
 
 In situations where blame has been assigned, a punishment usually follows, indicating 
that the blamed must now face the consequences of its actions.  As Tilly explains, the greater 
the estimated decrease in value caused by a particular outcome, the larger the punishment 
will be to the person or party that was blamed.313  In other words, just as amount of blame 
received depends on extent that the agent was deemed competent and responsible for an act, 
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typically the level of punishment is equal to the level of severity of the outcome of that act.  
Therefore, the goal is to “make the punishment fit the crime,” thus ensuring that justice was 
served and that victims are compensated for their loss.  Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 
1, blamers usually try to calculate the precise role an actor played in bringing about a 
negative outcome and in turn demand that the perpetrator’s penalty match the loss closely.  
Tilly notes that this sounds reasonable because “it follows a set of rules that evolution has 
wired into human brains: Do unto others as they have done to you.”314  Thus, if we follow 
this rubric, Russia especially, but also Georgia and South Ossetia, are due to face some 
severe repercussions for their actions in August. 
The 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, however, does not seem to follow this rule of 
assigning punishments.  Presumably, war would be one of the worst outcomes on a scale of 
severity, negativity, and loss; thus, it would follow, that a similarly severe punishment, or at 
least harsh consequences, should be exacted on the three warring parties.  This was not the 
case.  The international community’s response, in terms of its actions, has been fairly mild 
compared to the destruction of infrastructure, displacement of people, and loss of life as a 
result of this conflict.   While the international community made many threats of punishment, 
none of them were carried out in 2008 other than the suspension of EU partnership talks with 
Russia and the U.S. backing off from its strong support of NATO membership to Georgia.   
Initially, however, there were threats and warnings from the U.S. and some members 
of the EU, including the possibility of suspending Russia from the G8 group of the world’s 
leading industrialized countries, blocking Russia’s entry in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and calling on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to take away the 2014 
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Olympics awarded to the Russian city of Sochi, on the Black Sea coast, not far (roughly 15-
20 miles) from Russia’s border with Abkhazia.  The U.S. and UK hinted that Russia could be 
kicked out of the G8 following the conflict in August.315  Additionally, the G7 (all the G8 
members except Russia) issued statements condemning both Russia’s disproportionate use of 
force in Georgia as well as its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  “We deplore 
Russia’s excessive use of military force in Georgia...” and “Russia’s recognition of the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of Georgia and is contrary to UN Security Council resolutions supported by Russia,” the joint 
statement said.316  A spokeswoman for the British Foreign Office commented, “This is an 
unprecedented step.  This is believed to be the first time fellow members have all come out 
so strongly against the actions of another member.”317 
Another possible punishment that was tossed around was blocking Russia’s WTO 
membership.  U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez told Der Spiegel, that the U.S. has 
“welcomed them [Russia] into the group of the leading industrial nations.  We welcomed 
Russia’s desire to join the World Trade Organization” but “they are putting all that at risk,” 
after the war in Georgia.  While Guiterrez backed off from saying that Russia should be 
kicked out of the G8 and not allowed to join the WTO, he did suggest that the U.S. could 
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“stop being an advocate for Russia’s entry into the world community.”318  ICG agrees that 
Russia should face repercussions: “Moscow must be made to understand the advantages for 
its prestige, power and economy of being a partner in ensuring security in Europe rather than 
an outlier, subject to threats of exclusion from such institutions as the G8 and World Trade 
Organization (WTO).”319  Ultimately, however, Russia was not suspended from the G8 or 
from WTO membership, just reprimanded.   
Another potential punishment that was considered more heavily in the U.S. was 
revoking the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games from Russia.  U.S. Representatives Allyson 
Schwartz (D-Pa.) and Bill Shuster (R-Pa.) announced their intention to introduce a resolution 
calling on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to find a new venue for the 2014 
Winter Olympics.  “Russia must realize that its actions in Georgia will not be ignored by the 
international community.  We stand by Georgia, our friend and ally, and call on the IOC to 
designate a new venue for the Russian Olympics,” said Schwartz.  “Russia’s belligerence 
against the people of Georgia and their democratically elected government cannot go 
unpunished by the international community,” said Shuster.  “The Olympics are a time 
honored event that allows the nations of the world to put their differences aside for the purity 
of sport.  Russia’s blatant violation of the long respected ‘Olympic truce’ should be enough 
for the IOC to join with us in choosing a more worthy venue for the 2014 Winter 
Olympics.”320  Notably, Georgia’s “belligerence” against the people of South Ossetia was not 
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mentioned, nor was its contribution to the “blatant violation” of the ‘Olympic truce’ with its 
attack on Tskhinvali.  While there was a concerted effort in the U.S. Congress to push for the 
revocation of the Sochi Olympics from Russia, this also did not happen, and preparations are 
moving ahead for the games.321     
Michael Emerson highlighted that in addition to the EU’s statements condemning 
Russia’s actions, the suspension of partnership talks, and boycotting of the Sochi Olympics, 
the EU has additional repercussions it could invoke against Russia.   These included the 
revocation of visa facilitation for Russians, suspension of cooperative programs with Russia, 
as well as joint economic sanctions with the U.S., which could be aimed at banning Russian 
direct and real estate investment in the EU and/or freezing the financial assets of Russian 
companies and individuals.322  Similarly to the U.S., the EU did not exact any harsh 
punishments against Russia in an effort to keep Russia engaged as a partner.  Additionally, 
neither the U.S. nor the EU discussed tough consequences for the Georgians or South 
Ossetians, most likely because they were usually seen as the victims. 
Initially, U.S. and EU rhetoric and threats of punishment were severe, as we have 
seen above and in Chapter 5.  Ultimately, however, both sides backed down, acknowledging 
that blaming was not helpful in resolving the situation.  Consequently, Russia, Georgia, and 
South Ossetia faced very mild, almost negligible repercussions.  The fact that these three 
warring parties were not punished on a level commensurate with the atrocities they 
committed could be attributed to the nature of the international system.  International 
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relations theory stipulates that since there is no international policeman or enforceable 
international governing order, it is difficult if not impossible for states, as sovereign actors in 
an anarchical system, to punish each other because there is no higher authority that can 
effectively determine and enforce such punishments on sovereign states.  While various 
international organizations and institutions, such as the United Nations and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), have been developed in an attempt to establish and international 
governing system, most of these organizations do not have “teeth” and are ultimately 
subordinate to state sovereignty.   
Thus, this situation leaves us with several important questions to consider.  First, if it 
was decided that punishments were necessary, who would be responsible for devising and 
enforcing these punishments or penalties?  Given the nature of the international system, is it 
possible for one state to effectively punish another?  Additionally, is Russia, a “big” state, 
who sits on the UN Security Council and is an important strategic partner of the U.S. and EU, 
“immune” to the effects of potential repercussions?  Second, how could the possible 
punishments described above be enforced without further worsening the relationships 
between Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia as well as their relationships with the 
international community?  The act of punishing reinforces blame and could possibly 
encourage further divisiveness between the blamer/punisher and the blamed, i.e. the 
international community and the warring parties.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, does 
a lack of punishment imply impunity?  In other words, by not punishing any of the warring 
parties, is the international community sending the message that their actions were 
permissible?  As well as give the green light for them to be repeated?  Not exacting penalties 
against Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia additionally makes the international community 
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look weak and not willing to “get their hands dirty.”  Establishing appropriate repercussions 
is not easy, of course, as it would require the EU to unite not only its own members but also, 
most likely, with the United States.  However, taking punishments too far or 
“disproportionately” punishing Russia could make matters worse by encouraging 
divisiveness rather than cohesiveness.     
 
The Role of Blame 
 
 As discussed in this paper, assigning blame is way in which people, whether they are 
siblings, parents, friends, journalists, lawyers, or heads of state interpret as well as respond to 
complicated events and situations.  Highly contentious events, such as conflict and war, are 
often not only battlegrounds for soldiers, but also for blame.  As Tilly explains, war leads to 
the collective assignment of credit and blame more often than any other human activity.  
“Even revolutions, bungled natural disasters, political corruption, and economic crises 
produce less collective pointing of fingers at villains and heroes.”323  The assignment of 
blame in these situations is significant because the agent, or actor who is blamed, as well as 
the level of blame that the agent receives will often dictate what action, usually a form of 
punishment, will be taken against it.  The problem is that the assignment of blame depends 
on how the events are interpreted, which will vary from person to person and state to state, 
based on bias, whether conscious or unconscious, underlying motives, interests, and so on.  
Therefore, the actor that is responsible may not always be the one that is blamed and 
subsequently punished. 
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 The other problem that the assignment of blame presents is that it divides actors into 
very distinct groups of “right” and “wrong.”  Does this mean that if two actors get in a fight 
(or cause a war) then one has to be at fault while the other must be the victim?  Is it not 
possible that both actors are at fault, but perhaps for different reasons?  Blame often distracts 
and impedes observers from taking into account these smaller, but still important details that 
may indicate that both actors are to blame and therefore specific punishments must be 
determined for each actor based on each specific outcome.   
 Assigning blame also asks for justice to be served.  If an actor is blamed, it means 
that he or she did something wrong and must pay a price, often in the form of compensation 
to the victims of the agent’s action.  But who determines an appropriate punishment or 
ensures adequate compensation?  On the civilian level, these decisions are decided in 
courtrooms by a jury and a judge, but in instances of international conflict and war, there is 
not always a judge and a jury to try the offenders.  Thus, on the international level, the 
question of how justice will be served and how victims will be compensated is difficult to 
determine and, as a result, may lead to none of the offenders being held accountable. 
The 2008 conflict in South Ossetia highlights these problems and leaves us with a 
difficult situation.  Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia were not held adequately accountable 
for the outcome of their actions, but then again, even if they were, it may have just made 
matters worse.  In fact, as of March 2009, the U.S. has offered to push the “reset button” on 
its relationship with Russia.324  Additionally, it seems that the options for effective mediation 
by the international community are limited and have thus far proved unsuccessful.  Efforts to 
                                                 
324
 Mark Landler, “Lost in Translation: a U.S. Gift to Russia,” New York Times, March 6, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07/world/europe/07diplo.html?em, accessed April 2, 2009. 
 122 
 
engage Russian, Georgian, South Ossetian, and Abkhazian leaders in dialogue at a series of 
conventions held in Geneva, Switzerland under EU, UN, and OSCE mediation has made 
little or no progress due to continued arguments over the status of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.325  Russia’s unilateral recognition of these two regions not only undermined 
Georgia’s territorial integrity, which Russia supposedly claimed it supported, it also makes 
international mediation efforts that much more difficult. 
 Blaming further impedes these efforts by turning a complex conflict into a 
competition over which side was more responsible for starting the conflict or which side 
caused more death and destruction, the “winner” of which would then be awarded with 
international condemnation and blame.  Therefore, blame forces members of the international 
community to take the side of one country over another and subsequently get caught up in 
justifying why they picked that side, when in reality, the international community should not 
be fighting for one aggressor over the other, but for the rights and protection of innocent 
civilians.  The conflict between Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia, is indeed a difficult one 
that is steeped in a history of deep tensions and antagonisms, but it is not one that can or will 
ever be solved by violence.  I firmly believe that this conflict could have been prevented, had 
the international community paid more attention to it following the conflicts in the early 
1990s.  If nothing else, I hope that this conflict serves as a serious learning tool to improve 
conflict prevention and mediation efforts in the future.   
Thus, the most important question we need to ask ourselves in the aftermath of this 
conflict is not “who is to blame?” but “how do we keep this conflict from happening again?” 
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APPENDIX V: 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Timeline 
 
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
September 30, 2008 
SHORT CHRONOLOGY 331 
Peacekeeping Operation to Force Georgia to Peace 
 
7 August 2008  
 
00.40 - 00.57 - Georgian side opens cannon artillery fire on the SARABUKI and DMENISI 
  area. 
 
01.00 - Georgian armed forces command takes a decision to muster militiamen. 
 
02.13 - Georgian artillery opens fire from the KERE area at TSKHINVALI. 
 
09.40 - UBIATI comes under mortar shelling. 
 
14.30 - Georgian officers leave the Combined Headquarters (CHQ) of the Joint Peacekeeping 
  Force (JPKF) location. Duty stations abandoned by observers from the Georgian side. 
 
14.45 - Mortar shelling of NULI and AVNEVI. 
 
15.43 - 16.15 - Georgian armed forces units in AVNEVI fire from cannon artillery, tanks 
  and IFVs towards KHETAGUROVO; fire attacks delivered on the SVERI and 
ZEMO-NIKOZI area and on the southeastern outskirts of TSKHINVALI. 
 
19.00 - Shelling of TSKHINVALI. 
 
23.30 - Commander of peacekeeping operations at the Joint Staff of Georgian Armed Forces 
 Brig. Gen. MAMUKA KURASHVILI announces the start of combat operations  
against “Ossetian separatists.” 
 
23.40 - A massive fire attack on TSKHINVALI begins. 
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8 August 2008 
 
02.30 - Georgian AF units capture MUGUTI and start an offensive operation in two  
directions: MUGUTI, AVNEVI and KHETAGUROVO and MUGUTI, ZEMO- 
NIKOZI and TSKHINVALI. 
 
04.15 - Firing on TSKHINVALI begins. Georgian armed forces (tank units) fired by direct 
laying at the JPKF CHQ and peacekeeping battalion locations. 
 
06.00 - Georgian units assume the offensive on the city’s southern outskirts. 
 
07.40 - Georgian air force delivers an air strike on the DZHAVA cantonment and DIDI 
GUPTA Village. 
 
11.00 - The Security Council of South Ossetia asks Russia for help. 
 
11.54 - General mobilization declared in Georgia. In TSKHINVALI Georgian AF units,  
having seized the Yuzhny peacekeeping battalion cantonment, fought for the  
cantonment Severny. 
 
The Russian PKF battalion at Severny (upper) cantonment beat off 5 attacks and 
continued to fight. Its losses were: 2 men killed and 5 men wounded.  The 
Government House of the Republic of South Ossetia destroyed, and the state 
command center moved to the JPKF CHQ area. 
14.30 - Under these conditions the Russian Federation was compelled to reinforce its 
peacekeeping troops within the JPKF in order to carry out the peacekeeping tasks 
laid upon Russia, as well as to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia. 
 
22.00 - Reinforcement units advance toward the blocked peacekeepers in the 
 DZHAVA-TSKHINVALI sector, and engage Georgian units six km northeast of  
TSKHINVALI; units of Russian peacekeepers dig in on TSKHINVALI’s northern  
outskirts. A task force in the DZHAVA area formed to relieve the peacekeeping 
battalion. 
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APPENDIX VI: 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Timeline  
საქართველოს საგარეო საქმეთა სამინისტრო 
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Georgia   
 
 
                      Timeline of Events in the Russians Invasion & Occupation of Georgia 332 
 
The information below is accurate to the best of our knowledge, but is subject to verification. 
7 August  
• 09:00. South Ossetian separatist government leader threatens to “clean Georgians out” from the 
region.  In a morning interview with Russian news agencies, South Ossetian de facto president 
Eduard Kokoity declares that if the Georgian government does not withdraw its military forces 
from the region, he would start "to clean them out.” The Georgian military forces to which he 
refers are peacekeepers who are legally present in the South Ossetia conflict zone. 
• 09:45. A Russian military jet drops bombs near a Georgian military radar based 30 kilometers 
outside of the conflict zone.  According to local civilian witnesses, at about 09.45, a fighter 
plane, presumed to be Russian (it enters Georgia from the South Ossetian conflict zone) drops 3-
5 bombs near the village of Shavshvebi, approximately 300-500 meters from the location of a 
Georgian military radar. 
• 15:00. For the second time in two days, the separatist government of South Ossetia refuses to 
negotiate with Georgian envoy Temur Yakobashvili, who again travels to Tskhinvali to plead for 
peace.  Yakobashvili visits the conflict zone in the morning of August 7 to meet with 
representatives of the separatist government. The separatists refuse to meet or negotiate with 
him. Instead, Yakobashvili confers in Tskhinvali with Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the 
Joint Peacekeeping Forces. 
• 16:00. Three Georgian servicemen from the Georgian peacekeeping battalion are injured by 
paramilitary troops.   Separatist militia resume shelling the Georgian villages of Nuli and 
Avnevi.  Three Georgian servicemen are injured after the South Ossetian separatist forces blow 
up an infantry combat vehicle belonging to the Georgian peacekeeping battalion in Avnevi. 
Georgian police respond by firing towards the separatist militia in the village of Khetagurovo, 
where two separatist militiamen are killed and two more wounded. Later, the Georgian 
peacekeeping checkpoint in Avnevi is bombed and several Georgian servicemen and civilians 
are killed.  
• 18:30. The President of Georgia announces a unilateral cease fire.  Georgia announces a 
unilateral ceasefire in an attempt by the Government to defuse tensions. Temur Yakobashvili, the 
Georgian state minister for reintegration and envoy for conflict resolution, says at a press 
conference at 18:40 that he is continually seeking to contact the separatist authorities, but 
without success. 
• 20:00. President Saakashvili calls on Russia to recall those of its officials who are members of 
the South Ossetia separatist government.   President Saakashvili, speaking with journalists at the 
military hospital in Gori (where he is visiting two injured Georgian servicemen), reaffirms that 
despite the deadly attacks on Georgian villages, the Government of Georgia is showing 
maximum restraint. The President also calls on Russia to "to recall its officials” from South 
Ossetia, who are members of the so-called South Ossetian government. 
• 20:30. Despite Georgia’s unilateral cease-fire, the village of Avnevi in the South Ossetia conflict 
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zone— inhabited by ethnic Georgians— is totally destroyed by mortar fire.  Despite Georgia’s 
unilateral ceasefire, the Georgian village of Avnevi again comes under fire from South Ossetian 
militiamen. The village is totally destroyed.   
• 21:00. The Security Council of the separatist government threatens to employ Russian Cossack 
mercenary troops fight Georgian peacekeepers.  The chairman of the separatist republic’s 
Security Council, Anatoly Barankevich, says that armed Cossack militia from North Ossetia are 
heading towards South Ossetia to fight Georgian peacekeepers. 
• 22:30. Separatist paramilitaries attack the Georgian-controlled village of Prisi, leaving several 
civilians wounded.  
• 23:30. Heavy shelling by separatist forces destroy Georgian police stations on the administrative 
border of South Ossetia.  Separatist authorities open fire on all Georgian checkpoints around the 
South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali at about 23:30, including those located near the villages of 
Tamarasheni and Kurta. The police stations in the Georgian Kurta is destroyed as a result of 
heavy shelling. 
• 23:30. 100 Russian armored vehicles and Russian troops invade Georgia, crossing the Roki 
Tunnel from Russia into Georgia.  The Government of Georgia receives reliable information 
from three separate sources that approximately 100 armored vehicles and trucks of the Russian 
armed forces, filled with Russian soldiers, are passing from Russia over the border of Georgia 
through the Roki Tunnel and are heading towards Tskhinvali. The Russian Federation is thus 
directly violating the sovereignty of Georgia, as these new forces are regular Russian military 
and not peacekeepers. 
 
8 August 
• Early morning.  South Ossetian paramilitaries and Russian peacekeepers direct heavy fire on 
Georgian peacekeepers.  Intensive fire emanates from the Ossetian villages of Khetagurovo, 
Dmenisi, Sarabuki, and Ubiat. Separatist authorities continue shelling Georgian police and 
peacekeeping units with mortars and artillery. The Government of Georgia orders its forces to 
return only limited fire in order to defend their positions. 
• 04:28. For the first time, and in response to the entry of Russian armed forces into Georgian 
sovereign territory, Georgian military (as opposed to Georgian peacekeepers) enter the conflict 
zone.  Georgian government forces take control of six villages in the Tskhinvali region: Muguti, 
Dmenisi, Didmukha, Okona, Akut, and Kohati and enter the village of Khetagurovo. 
• 05:30. Additional Russian troops enter Georgia through the Roki Tunnel in South Ossetia.  They 
pass Java, cross the Gufta Bridge, and advance one the Dzara road towards Tskhinvali.  
• 08:00. Russian troops on the Gufta Bridge, connecting Djava and Tskhinvali, are the targets of a 
Georgian aerial bombardment.  Later, two more groups of Russian troops enter South Ossetia 
through the Roki Tunnel, which connects Russia and Georgia, but cannot cross the Gufta Bridge, 
which has been destroyed; they advance instead by the Geri-Dmenisi road. 
• 09:00. Georgian forces control the villages of Gromi, Artsevi,  Tsinagara, Znauri, Sarabuki, 
Khetagurovo, Atotsi, Kvemo Okuna, Dmenisi, Muguti, and Didmukha. 
• 09.45. A Russian military fighter plane bombs a Georgian military radar that lies 30 kilometers 
outside of the conflict zone.  
• 10.30. Seven civilians are injured by bombs dropped by Russian Su-24 fighter jets on the village 
of Variani in the Kareli district, 75 kilometers west of Tbilisi and 20 kilometers outside of the 
conflict zone.  
• 10.50. Six Russian Su-24 fighter jets enter Georgia from the Russian Federation. 
• 10:57. Russian aircraft drop three bombs on the town of Gori, well outside of the conflict zone. 
One bomb falls near the Gori stadium, a second near the Gorijvari slope, and a third near an 
artillery brigade. 
• 11:45. The emergency service of the Civil Aviation Authority reports receiving a signal from 
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what is presumed to be a Russian fighter plane that has crashed near the Iuri range, 17 kilometers 
south of Gori. 
• 11.45. Four Su-24 Russian fighter jets enter Georgia.  Four Su-24 Russian fighter jet enter 
Georgia from the direction of Stepantsminda (Kazbeg), northeast of the Roki Tunnel and outside 
of the conflict zone. Two of them pass Tbilisi and circle around Marneuli, south of Tbilisi. The 
other two circle above Gudauri, north of Tbilisi. 
• 12.05. A Russian Su-24 fighter jet enters Georgian air pace from Russia and remains over 
Tskhinvali until 12.15. 
• 13:00. Part of Tskhinvali comes under the control of the Georgian army and fighting continues 
in the center of the city.  
• 14.15. The Government of Georgia announces a three-hour ceasefire.  The Georgian government 
announces a ceasefire from 15.00 till 18.00 to allow civilians to leave Tskhinvali. The 
Government of Georgia offers the separatists full amnesty and humanitarian aid if they 
surrender.  
• 14.30. Georgian government forces control Tskhinvali; resistance comes from small militia 
groups. 
• 15:05. A Russian airplane bombs Vaziani airfield on the outskirts of Tbilisi.  A Russian bomber 
enters Georgia from the direction of Tedzami, just south of Gori, and drops two bombs on the 
Vaziani military airport. 
• 16:00. Georgian servicemen surround the village of Znauri near Tskhinvali.  About 40 police 
officers and reservists are trapped in Znauri school. 
• 16.30. Russia bombs Georgian airfields south of Tbilisi.  Russian planes bomb the Marneuli and 
Bolnisi military airbases, 20 kilometers and 35 kilometers south of Tbilisi respectively. Two 
Georgian aircraft are destroyed on ground, as are several buildings. There are numerous 
casualties. 
• 17:00. The Georgian airbase at Marneuli, 20 kilometers from Tbilisi and outside the conflict 
zones, is bombed again, causing casualties. 
• 17:35. Marneuli airbase bombed for a third time.  The Marneuli airbase is bombed for a third 
time, resulting in 1 death and 4 injured. As a result of the three bombings, three AN-2 type 
planes and several military vehicles are destroyed. 
• 18:32. Georgian villages come under Russian aerial and artillery fire.   Frone Gorge, northeast of 
Tskinvali, comes under intensive artillery fire from Russian forces. The villages of Avnevi and 
Phrisi, in the Tskinvali region, are bombarded by Russian military aircraft. 
• 18:44. Russian ground forces of the 58th Army attack Tskhinvali.  A column of Russian tanks, 
armored vehicles, and trucks reach Tskinvali by the Dzara bypass road, 2 kilometers west of 
Tskhinvali. Russian forces open intensive fire on Georgian forces located in Tskhinvali and on 
neighboring heights. A second column, also having come from Russia via the Roki Tunnel, is 
stopped near the Georgian government-controlled area of Dmenisi, 7 kilometers north of 
Tskinvali. Russian forces open heavy fire on Georgian forces. 
• 18:45. Five Russian airplanes bomb Georgian artillery brigade in Gori.  
• 19:18. Georgian forces down Russian jet near Tskhinvali, one of 5 planes shot down during the 
day. 
• 19:20. Russian jets pass over the town of Ambrolauri, outside of the conflict zone, 170 
kilometers northwest of Tbilisi. 
• 20:30. Georgian troops withdraw from Tskhinvali.  After severe clashes, Georgian forces start to 
withdraw from the center of the town, holding their positions at its southern outskirts. Russian 
tanks enter the eastern part of Tskhinvali. 
• 22:40. According to the data of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia Russian planes violated 
Georgian airspace a total of 22 times during the day. 
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APPENDIX VII: 
 
Timeline by Gordon Hahn 333 
 
AUGUST 7   
 
By the morning of August 7 Georgia had amassed 12,000 troops on its border to South Ossetia, and 
75 tanks and armored personnel carriers were positioned near Gori, according to Western observers 
interviewed after the war. [Manfred Ertel, Uwe Klussmann, Susanne Koelbl, Walter Mayr, Matthias 
Schepp, Holger Stark and Alexander Szandar, “Road to War in Georgia,” Der Spiegel, 25 August 
2008, posted on Johnson’s Russia List, #162, 31 August 2008, www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 
31 August 2008).]334 
 
South Ossetia president Kokoity states that “a large part of Georgia’s armed forces are located in the 
conflict zone” and that on the previous day Georgia brought up from Gori 26 152-millimeter 
howitzers, 20 tanks, and a large number self-propelled ordnance to level fire on the Prisi highground, 
which Georgian forces tried to take. According to Kokoity, the Georgians were stopped by Ossetian 
forces. [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226737.html citing RIA ‘Novosoti’ and  
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226738.html] 
 
The South Ossetian side reports weapons fire directed from the Georgian-controlled village of Erdevi 
aimed at the village of the Ossetian village of Dmenis beginning at 00:05am and intensifying as the 
night went on. Some time later Russian news agency ‘Interfax’ reports the sound of large caliber 
ordnance exploding on Tskhinvali’s north side. [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226717.html] 
 
[[At 9:45am a Russian military jet drops bombs near a Georgian military radar based 30 kilometers 
outside of the conflict zone. According to local civilian witnesses, at about 9:45am, a fighter plane, 
presumed to be Russian (it enters Georgia from the South Ossetian conflict zone) drops 3-5 bombs 
near the village of Shavshvebi, approximately 300-500 meters from the location of a Georgian 
military radar.]] 
 
South Ossetian MVD chief Medoev claims Ossetian forces have retaken the  
highground near Nul. [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226717.html] [[Separatist militia 
resume shelling the Georgian villages of Nuli.]] 
  
Citing South Ossetian Deputy Defense Minister Gassaev, ‘Interfax’ reports: Georgian “armour, 
artillery, and troops” are concentrating around the village of Dmenis and that it is under heavy fire 
with casualties and 20 percent of its houses destroyed; the villages of Sarabuk and Satikar are also 
under fire; and Georgian forces are firing and advancing on the Prisi highground. The South Ossetian 
authorities claim that their forces withheld return fire for a while, but now Ossetian forces have begun 
to respond in kind. [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226720.html] 
                                                 
333
 Gordon Hahn, “The Making Of The Georgian Five-Day War,” September 22, 2008, JRL 173 #29, 
September 24, 2008.  Excerpt: August 7- 8, 2008.  For complete text please see: 
http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/gordon-hahns-underground-.html. 
 
334
 Hahn’s note: Timeline from Georgia’s Foreign Ministry, accessed August 28, 2008, 
www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=461&info_id=7484p). [[Material from the Georgian 
timeline appears within double brackets.]]. 
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Tskhinvali states that the number of wounded on the Ossetian side as a result of heavy caliber artillery 
and mortar fire on Tskhinvakli coming from the Georgian villages of Ergneti and Nikozi is eight. 
[www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226742.html] 
 
Georgian Reintegration Minister Yakobashvili says the overnight fighting occurred as Georgian 
forces responded to fire from the Ossetian side which fired thinking Georgian forces had taken the 
Nul highground. He calls on the Ossetian side to cease firing on Georgian villages. [www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226735.html] -- Georgia’s Rustavi-2 television reports that the Ossetian 
side directed “intensive fire” on the Georgian villages of Eredvi and Prisi all night and later fired on 
the Sarabuk strategic highground wounding two. [www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226737.html] 
 
Georgian fire (from the Prednulskii district) resumes at 10am after a lull on Ubiati. [www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226739.html] 
 
Interfax reports eyewitnesses seeing 20 trucks of soldiers, 20 Toyota jeeps, 3 APCs, 3 rapid-fire 
artillery systems, 3 artillery canons and all together some 200 soldiers moving from Kutaisi to Gori. 
[www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226757.html] 
 
South Ossetia Security Council chairman Anatolii Barankevich accuses Georgia of moving large 
columns of troops towards South Ossetia, positioning 27 rapid-fire artillery systems ‘Grad’ in Gori 
raion, positioning forces all along South Ossetia’s border, and “beginning large-scale military 
aggression” against the breakaway republic. He states the village of Khetagurovo and its surroundings 
was subjected to two hours of heavy bombardment by Georgian 150-millimeter guns and that “the 
village is burning.” JPF spokesman Cpt. Ivanov reports that at 3:45pm local time the JCC’s Georgian 
military observers abandoned their post and at 3:50pm Georgian forces began firing on Khetagurovo. 
The JFP reports the area is quiet at 5:00pm.[www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226765.html 
citing Gazeta.ru and Itar-Tass] 
 
[[Separatist militia resume shelling the Georgian villages of Avnevi. Three Georgian servicemen are 
injured after the South Ossetian separatist forces blow up an infantry combat vehicle belonging to the 
Georgian peacekeeping battalion in Avnevi. Georgian police respond by firing towards the separatist 
militia in the village of Khetagurovo, where two separatist militiamen are killed and two more 
wounded. Later, the Georgian peacekeeping checkpoint in Avnevi is bombed and several Georgian 
servicemen and civilians are killed.]] Georgian MVD official Shota Khizanoshvili reports that the 
Ossetian side subjected the Georgian village of Avnevi to ninety minutes of “intensive fire” and that 
two Georgian peacekeeping soldiers were wounded when their military transport vehicle exploded. 
Georgian Rustavi-2 television reported that near a vehicle carrying journalists was fired upon near 
Ergneti. [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226765.html citing ‘Novosti-Gruzia’] 
 
NATO and the EU urge Georgia and South Ossetia “not to resort to violence and show restraint.” 
[www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226768.html] 
 
[[At 6:30pm Georgian president Saakashvili announces a unilateral ceasefire in an attempt by the 
Government to defuse tensions. Temur Yakobashvili, the Georgian state minister for reintegration 
and envoy for conflict resolution, says at a press conference at 6:40pm that he is continually seeking 
to contact the separatist authorities, but without success.]] 
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Kavkaz-uzel reports, without citing any source, that the Georgian and Ossetian sides have agreed to a 
ceasefire until a meeting between Georgian Integration Minister and South Ossetian JCC co-chairman 
Chochiev scheduled for August 8 under Russian sponsorship but outside the JCC framework.  
[www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226771.html] 
[[At 8:30pm, the village of Avnevi in the South Ossetia conflict zone inhabited by ethnic Georgians is 
totally destroyed by mortar fire.]] 
 
At 8:30pm Western intelligence reports that Georgian artillery opens fire on Tskhinvali. [Ertel, 
Klussmann, Koelbl, Mayr, Schepp, Stark and Szandar, “Road to War in Georgia,” Der Spiegel, 25 
August 2008.] 
 
[[At 9:00pm South Ossetia Security Council chairman Barankevich threatens to employ Russian 
Cossack mercenary troops from North Ossetia heading towards South Ossetia to fight Georgian 
peacekeepers.]] 
 
At 10:00pm Tbilisi informs JPF commander Kulakhmetov that the cease fire is terminated because of 
continued Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages. [Ertel, Klussmann, Koelbl, Mayr, Schepp, Stark and 
Szandar, “Road to War in Georgia,” Der Spiegel, 25 August 2008.] OSCE monitors report no such 
shelling. [Peter Finn, “A Two-Sided Descent into Full-Scale War,” Washington Post, August 17, 
2008, www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/16/AR2008081600502_pf.html 
cited in Nicolai Petro, “Crisis in the Caucasus: A Unified Timeline, August 7-16, 2008,” accessed on 
August 28, 2008 at http://npetro.net/7.html] 
 
[[At 10:30pm South Ossetia paramilitaries attack the Georgian-controlled village of Prisi, leaving 
several civilians wounded.]] 
 
At 11:05 Mamuka Kurashvili, chief of the Georgian Defense Ministry’s peacekeeping operations, 
declares the end of the ceasefire and the beginning of Georgian military operations to "restore 
constitutional order throughout the region" [“’Georgia Decided to Restore Constitutional Order in S. 
Ossetia’  MoD Official,” Civil Georgia, August 8, 2008, 
www.civil.georgia.ge/eng/article.php?id=18941&search=Kurashvili]. 
 
At 11:30pm heavy shelling of Tskhinvali resumes directed from the Georgian villages of Ergneti and 
Nikozi using ‘Grad’ rapdid-fire artillery systems. Georgian and Ossetian forces are engaged in battle 
at the edge of Tskhinvali [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226774.html citing Itas-Tass and 
the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee] 
 
[[At 11:30pm heavy shelling by South Ossetian forces open fire on all Georgian checkpoints around 
the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, including those located near the villages of Tamarasheni and 
Kurta. The police stations in the Georgian Kurta is destroyed as a result of heavy shelling.]] 
 
Georgian MVD analytical department chief Shotashvili states there were 10 killed and more than 50 
wounded by the alleged Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages that day. 
[www.kavkazuzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226772.html] 
 
AUGUST 8   
 
At 2:45am Georgia states its forces have occupied three villages in South  
Ossetia. [Petro, “Crisis in the Caucasus: A Unified Timeline” citing “Timeline by 13  
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August 16:20,” Ministry of Foerign Affairs of Georgia (August 1-13, 2008),  
www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=461&info_id=7347 (accessed August 26, 2008)] 
 
At 4:45am Georgian reintegration Minister Yakobashvili states that Tskhinvali is nearly surrounded 
and that Georgiam forces control two-thirds of South Ossetia. [Petro, “Crisis in the Caucasus: A 
Unified Timeline”] 
 
In early morning Georgian warplanes bomb Tskhinvali. [Uwe Klussmann, “Georgian Tanks  
Vs. Ossetian Teenagers,” Der Spiegel, August 26, 2008.] 
 
At 5:30am the Georgian Foreign Ministry issues its first report that Russian forces are crossing the 
Georgian border into South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel. [Petro, “Crisis in the Caucasus: A 
Unified Timeline” citing the Georgian Foreign Ministry’s “Timeline by 13 August 16:20”] After 
three days, all Georgian official statements and a new official Georgian Foreign Ministry timeline 
indicate that the crossing began six hours earlier at 11:30pm. [Petro, “Crisis in the Caucasus: A 
Unified Timeline” citing “Timeline of Events in the Russian Invasion and Occupation of Georgia, 
August 16, 2008, www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=461&info_id=7484 (accessed 
August 26, 2008)]  
 
The official Georgian timeline states: [[At 11:30pm the Government of Georgia receives reliable 
information from three separate sources that approximately 100 armored vehicles and trucks of the 
Russian armed forces, filled with Russian soldiers, are passing from Russia over the border of 
Georgia through the Roki Tunnel and are heading towards Tskhinvali. The Russian Federation is thus 
directly violating the sovereignty of Georgia, as these new forces are regular Russian military and not 
peacekeepers.]] 
 
At 9:00am South Ossetia requests Russia’s military support in the war and reports continued heavy 
shelling from ‘Grad’ artillery. [Petro, “Crisis in the Caucasus: A Unified Timeline” and www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1226778.html] 
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APPENDIX VIII: 
 
Competing Georgian and Russian Federation Storylines on the August 2008 War 335 
Storyline Features:  Georgian Government Storyline   Russian Government Storyline 
Situation Description  Russian invasion. Unprovoked attack  Humanitarian action to prevent 
on the West, freedom, civilized  genocide.  
values, democracy. Cutting the 
bloodlines of the economy. 
Historical Analogies  Invasion of Hungary (1956),    Appeasement of Hitler by the West. 
Czechoslovakia (1968, 1938),   Tskhinvali, a hero city, the 
Afghanistan (1979). German attack     “Stalingrad of the Caucasus.” Like 
on Poland (1939). Russian attack on  NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
Finland (1939).    Saakashvili as Saddam Hussein. 
 
Local Analogies   Bolshevik invasion and takeover of  Third Georgian genocidal campaign 
independent Georgia (1921).   against Ossetians (after 1921 and 
        1988–1992). 
 
Downscaled Primary Aggression. A big bully is attacking a   Aggression. Madness. Deranged 
Metaphor  small nation (person). “Looking into  person attacking innocents. 
   the eyes of evil.” 
 
Description of South Illegal separatists. Controlled by  Russian citizens (passport holders). A 
Ossetians  Russians. Fifth columnists.   small victimized people. 
   Criminals. Sudeten Germans. 
 
Description of Other  People with KGB backgrounds; return  NATO ally. American stooge. 
of Soviet system. Twenty-first 
century barbarians. 
 
Geopolitical  (Westernizing) Not “a faraway place”  (Localizing) Area of privileged 
Metaphors  (Chamberlain) but a modern normal  interest. 
   country that loves America. 
 
Explaining Discordant (that Georgia started it): Big powers  (that Russia is the aggressor): The 
Information  lie and use minorities to serve   West uses double standards to judge 
pre-established aims.   the behavior of Russia. Their actions 
        are cynical. 
 
Triggering Event   Russian build-up and tanks moving  Georgian attack on Tskhinvali and 
through Roki Tunnel.   murder of Russian peacekeepers. 
 
Attribution of Motives  Regime change; reassertion of Soviet/  Desperate attempt to get into NATO 
Russian Empire. Desire to   and acquire Western aid. Distraction 
extinguish vibrant democracy on the  from domestic problems. Actions of 
border. “They need control of energy  a bloodthirsty lunatic. 
routes. They need sea ports.” 
 
Meaning of Crisis   Invasion of a sovereign country.  War against states that violate 
Wake-up call to new Cold War  international law. Responsibility to 
between freedom-loving peoples  protect. Need for new security 
and restored KGB regime/evil  architecture for Europe 
empire. Ukraine next.
                                                 
335
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal), “Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia,” Eurasian 
Geography and Economics, 49, 6 (2008), p. 691. 
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APPENDIX IX: 
 
European Union Six-Point Peace Plan  
Negotiated by the President of France, Nikolas Sarkozy 336  
 
Protocole d’accord 
 
1 – Ne pas recourir à la force. 
2 – Cesser les hostilitiés de façon définitive. 
3 – Donner libre accès à l’aide humanitaire. 
4 – Les forces militaires géorgiennes devront se retirer dan leurs lieux habituels de  
 cantonnement. 
5 – Les forces militaires russes devront se retirer sure les lignes antérieures au  
 déclenchement des hostilitiés. Dans l’attente d’un mécanisme international, les forces 
 de paix russes mettront en œuvre des mesures additionnelles de sécurité. 
6 – Ouverture de discussions internationales sur les modalités de sécurité et de stabilité en 
  Abkhazie et en Ossétie de Sud. 
 
 
Unofficial English Translation of Six Point Peace Plan337 
 
Protocol of Accord 
 
1 – Not to use force. 
2 – Cease hostilities in a conclusive manner. 
3 – Provide free access to humanitarian aid. 
4 – The Georgian armed forces must withdraw to their habitual places of 
 cantonment. 
5 – The Russian armed forces must withdraw to the line where they were 
 stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Awaiting the establishment of an 
 international mechanisms, the Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional  
 security measures. 
6 – The opening of international discussions on the modalities of security and stability in  
 Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
                                                 
336
 Svante E. Cornell, Niklas Nilsson, Johanna Popjanevski, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications 
for Georgia and the World,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, August 2008, 
http://www.isdp.eu/files/publications/pp/08/0808Georgia-PP2.pdf, accessed November 26, 2008, p. 37. 
337
 Ibid, p. 38. 
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